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AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PERSPECTIVE ON
CONSENSUAL DECISIONMAKING
Andrew F. Popper*
INTRODUCTION
he purpose of this article is to explore the use of consensual
decisionmaking as a substitute for conventional public sector decisionmaking systems. The basic presumption is that the process of
negotiation will result in benefits which either do not exist under
present regimes, or could be expanded in a consensual system. The
potential benefits of negotiation can be recited without controversy:
directly and indirectly affected entities have access to basic decisional
process; there is a greater expectation of compliance with standards
that are negotiated than standards that are imposed; the cost of acquiring information decreases and the reliability of information increases;
in certain markets, negotiation can provide an ordering mechanism for
resource allocation; finally, the cost of government regulatory activity
declines as responsibility is shifted from agency decisionmakers to
private sector groups.
Conversely, consensual decisionmaking systems provide an opportunity for price fixing and other forms of anticompetitive activity. The
potential for price stabilization and market stagnation increases when
horizontally aligned competitors meet and discuss aspects of profit
making business on a regular basis. Standards evolved through the
consensual process may represent a "lowest common denominator"
suppressing further innovation and initiative in terms of technological
efficiency.
This article is divided into two sections; the first examines problems
with existing systems of administrative decisionmaking, and the second
*Professor of Law and Director of the Program for Advanced Studies in Federal
Regulatory Process. American University College of Law, Washington, D.C. George
Washington University, National Law Center, L.L. M. 1976; DePaul University College
of Law, J.D. 1973; Baldwin Wallace College, B.A. 1970. Copyright Q 1983 Andrew F.
Popper.
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focuses on present uses of consensual process. The thesis is that
present conventional forms of decisionmaking are expensive, timeconsuming and often fail to achieve desired public policy goals. Rulemaking and administrative adjudication are necessary mechanisms,
but well-recognized problems with these modes of decisionmaking
suggest more frequent utilization of consensual process as an alternative. The politically appealing "open market" mode of decisionmaking
is a second alternative, as evidenced by the deregulation of many major
regulatory systems. However, the marketplace will not always provide
the benefits and critical protections fundamental to various markets.
This is particularly so in a period when major structural antitrust cases
are held in disfavor by the executive branch, and when general federal
antitrust enforcement is at a low ebb. Again, increased use of consensual process seems a logical and compelling alternative.
The term "consensual process" is used to cover a number of different types of collective or participatory decisionmaking. In the second
half of this article, several general categories of consensual process are
reviewed and thereafter specific uses of consensus are examined. At a
base level, a consensual system involves decisionmaking by those most
affected by the outcome or result of the matter at hand, be it a rate,
product safety tolerance standard or a rule (in the context of"rulemaking"). The process can dilute or modify the role of an administrative
law judge or administrator, who has operated in a "command and
control" mode, substituting the decisionmaking of the consensual
group for that of the historically disinterested decisionmaker.
Setting up a formal consensual system, determining uniform means
of selecting parties, deciding on a process for oversight and review,
isolating specific subject matter jurisdiction of a consensual body and
analyzing the need for revision in existing statutory systems will be a
monumental task, well beyond the scope of this article. One need not
conclude each of these tasks to realize that there are many and varied
problems with existing decisionmaking systems and that consensual
process is one possible answer to those problems.
This piece is an endorsement of consideration of consensual decisionmaking. This endorsement is made based on the benefits inherent in consensual process and the disadvantages of conventional forms
of decisionmaking. Support for consensual systems, however, is conditionally based on the following four points. First, consensual systems
can be a breeding ground for the worst types of intercorporate conspiracy in direct contravention of our antitrust laws. Second, consensual systems can be abused and create serious distortions of power in
the marketplace, if voting-party selection and review are not done
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properly. Third, when consensual systems are set up by the Congress,
great care must be taken to ensure that the systems will implement
public policy, rather than be used to rubberstamp public imprimatur to
one-sided and biased determinations. Finally, consensual process requires a rethinking of many basic notions of fairness. The implementation of a consensual system may require the elimination of an adversary system which had been the cornerstone of party access and
procedural due process. Such gross editing of our basic systems must
be done with extreme caution.
Before evaluating whether a system which centers on the evolution
of consensus is a viable alternative to an adversary model which concentrates on clarifying the differences between parties and then selecting between the "positions" taken, some consideration must be given to
existing systems. Naturally, if one is of the opinion that present rulemaking and adjudicatory mechanisms are functioning effectively,
change to a new and untested system makes little sense.'
DYSFUNCTION IN PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONMAKING SYSTEMS AS A RATIONALE FOR
CONSIDERATION OF CONSENSUAL DECISIONMAKING
A. Systemic Problems with
Conventional Decisionmaking
One approach to supporting consensual decisionmaking is to argue
that the negotiation and settlement processes are inherently effective,
bonding decisionmakers with ultimate rules or standards, and thereby
ensuring a likelihood of compliance. In the inherent benefit argument
package, one would be likely to find discussions of increased access for
directly and indirectly affected parties, improved information flow,
and the potential for enriched competition, based on the presence of
uniform and available market knowledge.2
A second approach which may be used to support the consensual
decisionmaking argument is to assert that it is a reasonable alternative
worthy of immediate consideration in light of the deficiencies of rule'In American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982), the court found that not only would participants involved in consensual decisionmaking be personally liable if they used the format to restrain trade, but that an entire
association would be liable on an agency theory. This case and related antitrust problems
are discussed infra at I(D).
'Kerwin, An Analysis of Antitrust and Administrative Law Issuesfor Consensus Decisionmakingfrom a Legal and PoliticalScience Perspective,Presented to the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., in Boston, Mass., March 19, 1982, pp.
309-69.
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making and adjudication, the conventional forms of administrative
decisionmaking.
A recent proposal of the Administrative Conference of the United
States3 urges federal agencies to consider using negotiation and consensual decisionmaking as an alternative to conventional rulemaking.
The action of the Administrative Conference is predicated on the
belief that consensual decisionmaking and negotiation are inherently
valid forms of decisionmaking; however, the recommendation is also
the result of the Conference's belief that present forms of administrative decisionmaking are seriously flawed:
[I]ncreased formalization of the rulemaking process has ... had adverse
consequences. The participants, tend to develop adversarial relationships
with each other causing them to take extreme positions, to withhold information from one another, and to attack the legitimacy of opposing
positions. Because of the adversarial relationships, participants often do not
focus on creative solutions to problems, ranking of the issues involved in a
rulemaking, or the important details involved in a rule. Extensive factual
records are often developed beyond what is necessary. Long periods of delay
and participation in rIlemaking proceedings can become needlessly expensive. Moreover, many participants perceive their roles in the rulemaking
procedure more as positioning themselves for the subsequentjudicial review
than as contributing to a solution on the merits at the administrative level.
Finally, many participants remain dissatisfied with the policy judgments
made at the outcome of rulemaking proceedings.
Participants in rulemaking rarely meet as a group with each other and
with the Agency to communicate their respective views so that each can react
directly to the concerns and positions of the others in an effort to resolve
conflicts. Experience indicates that if parties in interest were to work
together to negotiate the text of a proposed rule, they might be able in some
circumstances to identify the major issues, gauge their importance to the
perspective parties, identify the information and data necessary to resolve
the issues, and develop a rule that is acceptable to the respective interests, all
within the contours of the substantive statute."
This condemnation of rulemaking coupled with the election of
negotiation as an alternative decisionmaking device has been suggested in the past.' However, the action of the Administrative Confer'Recommendation 82-4, "Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations,"
adopted June 18, 1982, by the Administrative Conference of the United States, copies of
recommendation available through ACUS, 2120 L Street, N.W. Suite 500, Washington,
D.C. 20037.
"Recommendation 82-4, supra, n. 3 at 1.
5There is no comprehensive inventory of existing consensual formats for regulatory
decisionmaking. However, the following readings can be viewed as a decent introduction
to the subject. Stewart, Regulation, Innovationand AdministrativeLaw, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1259
(1981); Note, RethinkingRegulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to TraditionalRulemaking,
HARV. L. REV. (1971); M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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ence is one of the few formal statements by an official body condemning rulemaking practices and opting for negotiation.'
In addition to arguing that consensual decisionmaking systems can
be used to formulate rules, instead of using rulemaking, such systems
can be used as a substitute for administrative adjudication. The criticisms leveled by the Administrative Conference are often applied to
adjudicatory settings, although the language often differs.7 The characteristics of a trial-type hearing are compelling when such hearings
are used to resolve disputes between private entities. However, the
dynamics of adjudication seem particularly inappropriate when that
system is used both for the formulation of policy and for the implementation of broad based government programs Tactics of delay and
various types of litigation posturing plague such adjudicatory systems,
frequently resulting in expensive and unmanageable proceedings.'
In an adjudicatory setting, directly affected parties play virtually no
role in issuing decisions, but instead are cast in the role of adversaries."'
The adversary environment creates hostility and resentment, and inevitably leads to a rejection of standards which evolve, and a disrespect
for such systems, with the end product being low compliance and
difficult enforcement."
6

P. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?, (Washington, D.C.:
Administrative Conference of the United States, Jan. 1982).
7
The problems with administrative adjudication need little recitation. At the agency
level, the problem is often referred to as "overjudicialization," a catch phrase suggesting
that adjudication can be time consuming, expensive and have a "generally debilitating
effect on the administrative mechanism." The President's Advisory Council on Executive
Organization, A New Regulatory Framework;Report on Select Independent Regulatory Agencies,
49-50 (1971) cited in S. BREYER and R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY (1979).
'See CRAMTON, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearingsin Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L.
REV. 585, 590 (1972) where the author asserts: "issues must be severely compressed and
put in bi-polar form.., procedure is intricate and specialized, lawyers come to dominate
the decisionmaking process even though many issues may be nonlegal.. .the adjudicator
...may be less concerned with long-term consequences of the decision or a series of
decisions. The focus on 'justice in the individual case' does not lend itself to intelligent
forward planning.., and to a concern for the aggregate effects of individual decisions."
'Report by R. Cole & P. Sommers for Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers,
Complying with Government Requirements: The Costs to Small and Larger Businesses,
Report to U.S. Small Business Administration, Grant #SB-IA0004-01-0, Sept., 1981.
'°DAVIS, Judicializationof Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing
Status of the HearingOfficer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389; MACY, TheAPA and the HearingExaminer:
Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351 (1967); ZWERDLING, Reflections on the
Role of the Administrative Law judge, 25 AD. L. REV. 9 (1973).
""Although the scope of the problem is unknown, it is likely that in a very large
number of cases regulatory toughness in its legalistic manifestation creates resentment
and resistance, undermines attitude and information sharing practices that could otherwise be cooperative and constructive, and diverts energies of both sides into pointless and
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There is little dispute that a negotiation format can be used as a
decisionmaking device for matters now resolved through the adversary process.12 Whether negotiation will provide a smooth and swift
system of dispute resolution is another question. Basic role perceptions
will change, and redefinition of the function of administrative law
judges will be a necessity.' 3 Such fundamental redefinition will require
changes in the Administrative Procedure Act 4 and in other basic
substantive legislation affecting administrative action.' 5 Under the
present system, agencies play a significant role in assisting parties in the
negotiation and settlement process."' Should negotiation and consensual decisionmaking become a part of the compulsory agency process,
there is little reason to think that agencies would be incapable of
performing the assistance roles necessary, though there is no existing
agency model to support this proposition. 7
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical data studying consensual decisionmaking as a component of agency process,' 8 there is nonetheless
dispiriting legal routines and conflicts." R.

KAGAN &
THE PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS
2
S L. Langbein, Negotiation and Compliance: The

E. BARDACH, GOING BY THE BOOK:
(1982).
Case of the Auto Emission Control

Program (August 1981) (unpublished paper). B.

OWEN

& R.

REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS

BRAEUTIGAN, THE

(1978).

'"See supra n. 10.
"5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. (1976).
'See

(1975);
(1976).
U.S. v.
special

BARBER, THE CONSTITUrION AND THE DELEGATION

OF CONGRESSIONAL

POWER

Freedman, Delegationof Power and InstitutionalCompetence, 43 U. CHi. L. REV.307
As to the power of thejudiciary to designate alternate decisionmaking systems, see
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683, n. I1 (1980) regarding an inherent power to appoint
masters.

"See
P. SCHUCK,
7

LITIGATION, BARGAINING AND REGULATION

(1979).

Opportunities for achieving negotiated settlements are not outlined in great detail
for most agencies. Empirical studies are few, and those which exist concentrate on
enforcement proceedings rather than negotiating exemptions and exceptions to rulemaking. See C. Diver, Regulatory Plea-Bargaining: A Case Study of the Enforcement of
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (paper presented at the 1981 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (September 1981). See also P.
HARTER,supra, note 7 at 37-38; Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiationas an Alternativeto

Traditional Rulemaking, 94

HARV. L. REV.

1871 (1981).

"An excellent nonempirical analysis of consensus decisionmaking finds these values:
... [Wihile the adversary system encourages "exaggerated, inflexible posturing,"
negotiation yields a pragmatic search for intermediate solutions. Because negotiators
learn other parties' economic and political constraints, they may realize the impracticability of their own bargaining position and discover more common ground than they
would as adversaries. Negotiation exposes genuine preferences by forcing parties to
rank their goals and trade lesser items for desiderata. Finally, while lawyers and
lobbyists-who by training and business interest thrive on disputes-run the adversary
process, leaders of the affected groups-who are more interested in the outcome than
the fight-would themselves be the principals in the negotiation process. Note,
Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to TraditionalRulemaking, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1871, 1876-77 (1981).
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overwhelming support in the literature for the proposition that consensual decisionmaking and negotiation models are valuable and
under-utilized means of decisionmaking.' The very idea of collective
action and negotiation, frequently expressed as sub-government decisionmaking, has been central to political science literature for some
years.2 1 Should the proposal of the Administrative Conference pass
through Congress, then some of the ideas on consensual decisionmak2
ing and regulatory negotiation will be tested very quickly. 1
Will consensual decisionmaking work more efficiently than existing
systems? "Regulatory negotiation is a type of interest representation.
•.

.

It relies not on the opinions of appointed administrators . . .

developed through an adversary process but on the views of those
directly affected. If negotiators effectively represent all interests,
negotiation should make the administrative process more democratic
while enhancing regulatory efficiency. ' 22 The role a federal agency
would play, however, is by no means clear. For example, if negotiation
fails the benefits of consensual process become inconsequential, and
the need for agency action returns.
Negotiation failures could be the triggering device for the conventional notice and comment rulemaking.2' A different approach would
impose a highly expedited model of agency rulemaking, coupled with a
piercing judicial review as the "second tier," should the negotiation
model not come to resolution. A third alternative would involve the
development of an arbitration system to be activated in the event that
negotiation does not produce a useful result within a fixed time frame.
Arbitration could be conducted by a small number of designated
representatives and would be binding on all parties.
Whatever problems consensual systems might encounter, the risk
seems well worth the undertaking. This is especially true when one
considers the present state of administrative process.

"Commission on Law and the Economy,

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL

REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM: EXPOSURE DRAFT p.

115 (Washington, D.C. American

Bar Association, Aug. 5, 1978).

20
J. MANSBRIDGE,
BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?

(1976); D. TURMAN, THE
(1961); T. Lowi, THE END OF

LIBERALISM (1969).

"P. HARTER, supra note 6 concerning S. 1601, the Regulatory Mediation Act of 1981,
97th Cong., istSess., September 9, 1981, which seeks to "establish an alternative
rulemaking procedure which includes the establishment of regulatory negotiation committees," at 4 of the bill.
22
Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to TraditionalRulemaking, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1875-76 (1981).
"1d. at 1876.
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B. A Caselaw Perspective of
Existing Systems
The system of administrative decisionmaking is currently undergoing thorough review. Judicial review of administrative action suggests disenchantment with the existing methodology of decisionmaking, substance of decisions, and the scope of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the last few years. 4 The problem with
agency decisionmaking reflects a perceived national distrust, disinterest, or misunderstanding of federal regulatory procedures. An antiregulatory sentiment is often coupled with demands for consideration
of alternatives, 5 although no broad based reform has occurred.26
While there are a variety of reasons for the disenchantment, and
while one might contest the intensity of the attack on agency decisionmaking, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the last five years
have witnessed a vigorous and comprehensive attack on major regulatory systems.27
This undifferentiated assault constitutes a dangerous development,
particularly in the area of health and safety.28 The "marketplace" does
not protect the environment, or enhance the public's health and safety.
Furthermore, certain forms of economic regulation are critical to a
stable, functioning, nondiscriminatory, oganizationally diverse and
competitive economy. This ideological perspective is far less important
"'Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981); American Trucking Assn's.,
Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1981); Hatch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n.,
654 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. Turner, 609 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1980); Office of
Consumers Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 655 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1977); Illinois v. Gorsuch, No. 78-1689
(D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1981).
2"Note,
supra, note 22; Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory FailureMismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549,578 (1978); Volner, Gettingthe HorseBefore
the Cart: Identifying the Causes of Failurein the Regulatory Comm'ns, 5 HOFSrRA L. REV. 285,
311 (1977); Bliss, Flexible FederalAgency Regulation,8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 619,637(1981);
Reagan Team Retreats on FTS's Scope, Washington Post, March 3, 1981, § F at 1.
"For the most recent efforts, see Regulatory Reform Act, Report of the Comm. on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate to accompany S.1080, S. REP. No. 97-284, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
"TMajor deregulation legislation included: Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94
Stat. 793 (1980); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980);
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978); Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat.
132 (1980).
2
1There is little question that health, safety, and environmental issues are "externalities
which the market cannot fix." The ProposedRegulatory Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1080,
Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1981) (statement of Robert B. Lave). See also Ramo, The Regulation of Technological
Activities: A New Approach, 1981 A.B.A. J. 1456, 1456 (stating "[n]o marketplace sets a
price for an extra year of life or a month's supply of breathable air.")
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than an assessment of what has occurred; and what has occurred in a
number of areas is substantial evisceration of the protection provided
by governmental intervention.
While our regulatory system must change and respond to the demand for a more appropriate role for the federal government, the
next generation of federal regulation is not predetermined. Now is the
time for critical examination of alternatives to current regulatory process. If consensual decisionmaking, using a negotiation format, is
effective, inexpensive, and unintrusive, it could become an important
component of the American regulatory calculus. It has been underutilized in the past, leaving federal employees with the staggering responsibility of making tens of thousands of decisions in isolation. Carefully
planned, such systems can avoid the disadvantages inherent in governmental "corporatism," and allow the government to play an
efficient and compelling role. Consensual decisionmaking systems can
be developed that include government participation as one component
of a decisionmaking group, rather than as the singular decisionmaking
entity. Simply stated, interaction between parties of varying interest
(ultimately broken down through the voting process) coupled with
direct participation and oversight by federal agencies, may be the
regulatory model of the future.
The conclusion that major changes are needed in the manner in
which administrative decisions are made stems in part from a review of
several select and typical judicial decisions. These are cases where
courts have remanded cases to agencies because the agency misinterpreted its congressional mandate, failed to follow basic procedural
requirements, and where agencies appear to have abdicated their
primary statutory responsibilities.
In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,29 the Court was confronted with guidelines and restrictions
issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission after the passage of
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.1" The Court acknowledged that while
agencies were to be accorded considerable latitude in the issuance of
"interpretive rules" and "general statements of policy" that latitude
does not include the general authority to reinterpret a congressional
mandate.' In interpreting the act, the Commission decided that general commodities carriers could perform household goods transit with29659 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1981).
3
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793
(1976).
315 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976). See, e.g., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Iowa Power and Light v. Burlington Northern, 647 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1981);
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 664 F.2d 79
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
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out any additional demonstration of fitness, willingness or capacity to
provide household goods service. In finding this interpretation to be
outside the obvious meaning of the congressional mandate, the Court
held:
lI]t is illogical and unreasonable for the Commission to permit any general
commodities carrier to perform household goods transportation without
any further demonstration of its fitness, willingness, and ability to perform
such service."
The strength of the Court's condemnation is noteworthy. In characterizing Commission action as "illogical and unreasonable," the Court's
dissatisfaction with the Commission's activity is apparent. Similarly, on
the question on the expansion of existing authority, the Court stated:
We are unable to find support in the statutory language for the Commission's conclusion that it was required, or even authorized, to implement the
policies of the Motor Carrier Act by granting to new applicants the very
broad authorities it prescribes."
In condemning the Commission for its expansion of congressional
mandate, the court acknowledged that the acts of the Commission were
well-intended. The Commission's motivation for expansion of authority does not excuse the abuse of discretion.
These objectives may be laudable. They would be served even better by the
complete removal of all licensing requirements. .

.

. Congress did not,

however, see fit to deregulate motor carriage. Indeed, it explicitly forbade
the Commission to go beyond the powers vested in it by statute and provided
it in such detail, both for the removal of restrictions on existing certificates
and for the alteration of the public convenience showing necessary for the
approval of new certificates, that it would be anomalous to leave to inference
a matter of such significance as the general broadening of new authority....
The Motor Carrier Act continues to require the Commission to exact in
the future, the showing of at least general fitness, willingness and ability to
perform the services authorized by the certificates. . ...
In addition to the court's finding that the Commission had misinterpreted basic components of the certification system, the court found
the Commission had created a genuine risk in the tank truck area by
allowing the certification of carriers not properly suited for the transportation of hazardous bulk materials." The American Trucking Association case thus reflects an example of the desire of an administrative
-2659 F.2d
"659 F.2d
"1659 F.2d
15659 F.2d

at 467.
at 470.
at 452.
at 454.
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agency to reduce and eliminate regulatory provisions which Congress
found necessary.
A different, but nonetheless serious problem in agency misinterpretation occurs where federal agencies seek to alter requirements in a
direction different from that set out in congressional mandates. For
example, in Office of Consumer's Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission,3 the court condemned the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission for exercising direct authority over the manufacture of
unmixed synthetic fuels, when no such authority was intended by the
Congress. The Court held:
It is not for an administrative agency, however, to preempt Congressional
action or to "fill in" where it believes some federal action is needed. It goes
without saying that appropriate respect for legislative authority requires
regulatory agencies to refrain from the temptation to stretch theirjurisdiction to decide questions of competing public priorities whose resolution
properly lies with the Congress.
In sum.... the Commission acted without proper authority.... Congress
has repeatedly declined to permit any extension of FERC authority into the
synthetic gas area; on the other hand, it has specifically authorized a different governmental unit to undertake the tasks which FERC sought to perform through questionable use of its regulatory tools. In addition FERC
improperly ignored contemporaneous congressional activity in its attempt
to "fill in" where it believed some federal financial help was needed."
Again the court acknowledged that the agency acted in a wellintended manner seeking to resolve the nation's energy problems, but
found no justification for an obvious expansion of congressional
authority." Any administrative agency's inherent power includes the
prescription of rules and regulations; it is not the power to make new
law, or by regulation to render existing laws a nullity. 9 The appropriate role of a federal agency "remains basically to execute legislative
policy; they are no more authorized than our courts to rewrite acts of
Congress."4
The cases involving an agency's attempt to expand its mandate
should be distinguished from decisions where courts disagree with an
agency's substantive factual findings, or matters of legal interpretation
F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
-1655 F.2d at 1152-53.
"8Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981); E.I.
duPont de Nemours and Co. v.Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976); Aqua Slide 'n'Dive
Corp.
v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
39
Natalie Tank Ships Corp. v. Panama Canal Comm'n., 506 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C.
1980).
"Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).
36655
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where courts and agencies differ. These cases are the historical grist of
judicial review, and courts continue to perform substantive oversight. 4'
Likewise, courts continue to defer to agency fact-finding, agency interpretation of substantive statutes, and to the choices agencies make
in deciding whether to conduct a rulemaking or an adjudicatory
42
proceeding.
The end product of dissatisfaction with administrative action has
been the confinement of agencyjurisdiction. Notwithstanding a strong
argument to the contrary, the court held in Greyhound Corporation v.
ICC "- that the ICC did not have jurisdiction over the Greyhound
Corporation's securities activities. Similarly, in FederalTrade Commission
v. Turner4 the court confined a section of the Federal Trade Commission Act which, the Commission argued, provided authority to determine the practical feasibility1 of various damage actions on behalf of
the general public.46 "Absent a specific congressional mandate or a
clearly discernable statutory implication, we will not find that the FTC
has the claimed investigative authority in its new role."47
Some further recent cases reflect judicial attacks on agency action,
where the procedures followed by agencies appear to either obscure
congressional intent, or frustrate basic rights and interests the agencies
are required to protect. 8 In Illinois v. Gorsuch," the court held that the
delays by the Environmental Protection Agency in promulgating regulations for hazardous wastes bordered on an abdication of statutory
responsibility. The court refused to permit the agency to delay the
publication of rules, a power the agency believed it had. It ordered the
agency to enforce explicit statutory deadlines challenging the tradi41
See
42

infra n. 38.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Adm'r, 613
F.2d 298 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979); Koch Refining Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 658 F.2d
799 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981). But see Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 651 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1981) which held that while the decision of a
federal agency is entitled to great deference, if the agency proffers an inadequate or
improper ground for that decision, a court is powerless to substitute what that court
believes to be a more appropriate or proper basis for the decision; Firestone Synthethic
Rubber and Latex Co. v. Marshall, 507 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1981), Rank Precision
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 660 F.2d 476 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Taylor Wine Co., Inc. v.
Dept. of the Treasury, 509 F. Supp. 792 (D.C.C. 1981).
'11551 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
41609 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1980).
,,Compare Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981) which restricts basic
adjudicatory power of the agency.
46609 F.2d at 745.
,7Id.
'8Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-0906
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (just reargued in D.C. Cir., Dec. 1982).
'No. 78-1689 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1981).
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tionally discretionary housekeeping powers of the agency. In a similar
vein, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
condemned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for a
failure to promulgate statutorily mandated standards on drinking
water for various types of seasonal agricultural functions.5
A vigorous attack on agency action can be found in Ford Motor
Company v. Federal Trade Commission5' The court held that the FTC
would be prohibited from announcing a rule of broad and general
applicability in an agency adjudication.5 Though the Federal Trade
Commission could have promulgated its rule of general applicability in
an ongoing rulemaking, the decision to announce the rule in an adjudication was deemed to be in excess of federal agency jurisdiction.5
This type of jurisdictional restriction seems as much a political statement of the court's dissatisfaction with agency decisionmaking as it
does a judicial interpretation of prior opinions:'
The power to articulate new standards in an adjudication is limited,
requiring the agency to evaluate the destructive nature of a retroactive
standard against the need for the agency action.5 5 The court's decision
in Ford seems to challenge the power of the agency to make such a
balancing. A variation on this theme is McDonald v. Watt6 where the
Fifth Circuit found that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
had, in all likelihood, failed to do the basic balancing required prior to
the articulation of a retroactive standard.57 Similarly, in Sheperd v. Merit
Systems ProtectionBoard,5" a court found that the agency failed to consider the effect of the complexity of its regulations on those subject
thereto, suggesting an insensitivity to basic procedural requirements
on the part of the agency. 9
Justifiable dissatisfaction with agency decisionmaking exists. Agencies have been scolded for failing to follow their own rules," to provide
5"National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Donovan, No. 73-2142 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 1981).
5'654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
52
1d at 601.

"'This portion of the opinion appears to directly conflict with SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947) and with Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974).
-654 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
56653 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1981).
5
7The Court did not address directly the misapplication of Chenery since it found an
abuse of discretion in other components of the agency decision. 653 F.2d at 1045-46.
58652 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5
"ld at 1045.
'"Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1981); Baton Rouge
Maire Contractors, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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a needed forum, and for procedurally shortchanging parties by labeling interests affecting decisions as "interpretive rules policy
guidelines."" These shortcomings alone do not mandate a radical shift
to alternate forms of decisionmaking. However they are sufficient to
suggest serious consideration of other systems.
In proposing consideration of an alternative form of decisionmaking, in part predicated on the dysfunction displayed in the cases above,
some thought must be given to the general question of agency competence. One interpretation of the above sampling of cases is that agencies can no longer be expected to perform efficiently." However, there
is no meaningful empirical data to support that contention. "[R]egulatory commissions have performed their functions far better than currently credited and . . . their failings and shortcomings are specific,
concrete and readily susceptible to remedy."" Agencies have been
overseeing systemic modifications and changes in regulatory functions
have produced highly beneficial results.'4 However, there has been
only a limited response to criticisms of dysfunction and few examples
of agencies undertaking affirmative steps to improve their decisionmaking process."1 Accordingly what is suggested is notjust fine tuning
of existing systems but consideration of an alternative means of decisionmaking.
It is impossible to predict what changes will occur in the next few
years, though it is likely that there will be revisions of substantive law."'
"Batterton v. Marshall 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gott v. Cleland, see note 48;
of Scientology of Cal. v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Church
2
6 V. Rosenbloom, Competition as a Nostrum for Regulated Industries: Legal Factors
of Precedent and Primacy (1975) (Conference paper, Northwestern Univ. Law School),
states as follows:
If agency practices fail to expand public participation in government, to focus public
spotlight on wasteful and inefficient practices, or to produce prices, supplies and
quality or service within an equitable range for all of us, it is not because the inherent
incapacities of the regulatory system are as nonexistent as the Emperor's new clothes in
the children's fable. The fault lies rather with the inadequacies, mediocrities and
occasional political perversities that have been allowed or encouraged at times to creep
into its administration and implementation.
"VWolner, Gettingthe Horse Before the Cart: Identifying the Causes ofFailurein the Regulatory
Commissions, 5 Hovs'ri L. REV. 285, 311 (1977).
"See, e.g., the proposal of the Federal Communications Commission to deregulate
radio, 44 Fed. Reg. 57, 636 (1979).
15E.g., in 1974 Paul Posner suggested that federal agencies must begin to weigh the
value of a regulation against the anticompetitive effect and the need for enforcement.
Posner, The Proper RelationshipBetween State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 714-15 (1974). Such a weighing evolved in a different form in Exec.
Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,192 (1981), and in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
""U.S. DismantlingConsumer ProtectionProgram,Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1981 § H at 1:
Steadily and quickly, the Reagan Administration is rolling back more than 15 years of
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However, it may well be that these "reforms" are perceived as necessary because of the dissatisfaction with the process and results of
standard administrative decisionmaking. A model which gives to those
affected a role in the decisionmaking process, may engender a thoroughly different political response. Whatever that future response
may be, the present perception of the validity of administrative systems
is best measured by taking stock of the last few years. Congress has
eliminated major components of agency responsibility, 7 while agencies
have followed suit by abdicating existing responsibilities." The variety
of "cutbacks" of the federal system is well recognized." While there are
isolated examples of agencies attempting to respond affirmatively to
the onslaught, 6 the general condition of the regulatory environment is
unstable.
The changes in the nature and scope of federal agency activities,
which have produced a vacuum in critical areas, might not be so
disturbing, were an aggressive antitrust enforcement policy in place,
creating additional market pressures. However, that antitrust vigor is
not readily apparent. 7' It is certainly not apparent in the regulated
Consumer Protection Regulation. From the FTC to the Food and Drug Administration to U.S.D.A., Reagan appointees are reversing, suspending and reviewing dozens
of rules that had represented some of the biggest achievements of the consumer
movement.... The existence of some of the very agencies that were created by the
consumer movement are in jeopardy. Earlier this year the administration proposed
the abolition of the 9 year old Consumer Product Safety Commission. Although
Congress failed to go along with this proposal, it did agree to the President's proposal
to cut CPSC's budget by 30%....
67
See supra n.27.
"See, e.g., In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., 1981), Federal Trade Commission
dropped an eight year investigation into the Exxon Corporation explaining its action
only by saying that the litigation had become unwieldy and impracticable. Id at 4.
69
See Reagan Regulatory Era, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 26, 1981, at 1; Computer
and Communications Industry v. FCC, No. 80-1471 (pending D.D.C. 1981), in which
the Justice Department has attacked the FCC in a brief filed in the first week of
November 1981, on the grounds that the FCC has never explained how it can allow
AT&T to set up corporate subsidiaries without using its monopoly power to gain
advantages in various unregulated markets. Segments of the department's brief are
reported in Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 9, 1981, at 14; see also, EPA Steps Back from
Money Penalties, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 30, 1981 at 1.
7
See Press Release No. 81-91, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office
of Public Affairs, issued June 8, 1981, in which the Commission announced a series of
procedural modifications in the licensing process for nuclear power plants, all designed
to shorten the hearing process and to limit multiple participation by intervenors. Regulatory PractitionersShift with Changing Winds, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 30, 1981
at 1.
7
See Commentary and Insight; Antitrust Enforcement has More Staff than Policy, Legal
Times of Washington, Oct. 12, 1981, at 11, Antitrust: Big Business Breathes Easier, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1981, § 3 at 1, Return to "Neutral" Antitrust Enforcement Era Predicted,
N.Y.L. J., June 2, 1980, at 21; for administrative cases, see In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934
(F.T.C. filed Sept. 22, 1981); In re Kellogg Co., General Mills, Inc., General Foods, No.
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industries where there is a well-recognized congressional failure to
provide direction for a uniform policy on competition.72 Alternatively,
the fact that the "Congress has created bad regulatory legislation '""h is a
possible explanation for the radical change in the influence and prestige of regulatory process. In this environment of changing regulation
and modified antitrust enforcement, the appropriate role of the federal government in the next decade is at issue.
A projection of this article is that the government may become a
participant in a variety of different forms of decisionmaking where
affected parties become actual decisionmakers. This is suggested with
the understanding that there are those who believe that no matter what
the government does, it will be fatally flawed by the fact that the federal
government is doing it.Justice Douglas articulated this sentiment in his
dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.7"
The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt. But they are
notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them
through advisory committees, or friendly working relationships, or who
have that natural affinity with the agency which in time develops between the
regulator and the regulated. As early as 1894, Attorney General Olney
predicted that regulatory agencies might become "industry-minded," as
illustrated by his forecast concerning the Interstate Commerce Commission:
The Commission ... is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It
satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads,

at the same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal....
M. Josephson, The Politicos, 526 (1938).
Years later a court of appeals observed, "The recurring question which
has a plagued public regulation of industry [is] unduly oriented toward the
interests of the industry it is designed to regulate, rather than the public
interest it is designed to protect.""5
Obviously, there are some who believe that federal agencies are

inherently incapable of functioning effectively and for them arguments about consensual decisionmaking will be as suspect as were

8883 (F.T.C. filed Sept. 1, 1981); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 9108 (F.T.C.
filed
72 Oct. 20, 1980).
Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L. REv. 1,
68-69 (1976). Regarding the reduction in the effect of the antitrust laws, it should be
noted that "[t]he antitrust laws are most effective in their efforts to preserve competitive
market structures through prohibitions on mergers." Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 578 (1979).
"Ramo, The Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, 67 A.B.A. J. 1456
(1981).
7405 U.S. 727 (1972).
75
1d at 747.
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discussions on rulemaking a decade ago. 76 Some type of federal decisionmaking system will, however, be in operation. Resolving the
problems experienced by federal agencies in promulgating effective
standards, and similar regulatory dysfunction through existing procedures seems unlikely," however, where expediting devices are used
which exclude effective public participation."8 In this regard, the comments of John F. Kemeny are instructive:
Our decisionmaking process is breaking down. The problem is whether our

current political process can handle the complex issues of modern societyhighly technical questions of science and technology that also involve value

judgements.... I am still a believer in democracy, but I think some changes
will have to happen in the practice of it. We have to have a forum for
effective discussion of highly technological issues, so that there is a clear
consensus on what science and technology say about an issue. Then the
political process can make the value judgement. 7

C. Changes in the Regulatory
Process in Terms of
Competition Policy
Political changes have given rise to shifts in regulatory emphasis
creating new and perplexing questions. One would have thought that
deregulation would have spurred an increase in antitrust activity.
Instead federal antitrust efforts no longer appear to protect general
market diversity interests, nor demonstrate concern over concentrated
markets. Since the vigor of regulation has been historically balanced
against the extent to which antitrust matters are pursued, a decline in
antitrust enforcement should be accompanied by an increase in effective regulation. However, the Federal Trade Commission cases discussed below are illustrative of the lack of "regulatory antitrust" activity. When one considers the massive changes in standard regulatory
systems,8" the disenchantment with the existing administrative agencies, and those phenomena are coupled with reduced antitrust vigor,
the need to consider alternatives, such as consensual process, becomes
most pronounced.
76
One scathing commentary regarding the inefficiency of the Interstate Commerce
Commission is in Felieth, The Interstate Commerce Omission: The Nader Report on
the ICC 311-25 (1970).
77Ramo, The Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, 67 A.B.A. J. 1456,
1462
78 (1981).
See, e.g., Allera, FDA's Use of Guidelines, Notices of ProposedRulemaking, and Compliance
Policies
as de Facto Rules: An Abuse of Discretion, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. J. 270 (1981).
78
Ramo, supra, note 77 at 1462.
8
See supra n.27.
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In October 1980, the Federal Trade Commission decided In the
Matter of E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co.8 In that case, the Commission
was confronted with an entity which enjoyed significant market power
and had participated in a series of pricing practices, as well as market
projections, which the staff alleged were a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.82 The decision issued by the Commission absolved DuPont, using a slightly unusual interpretation of United
8 "
States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica.
The opinion suggests that Alcoa is not
a case which should be used to support the proposition that certain
forms of market control are unlawful. Rather, the Commission perceives Alcoa as permitting monopolies created by natural phenomenon,
force of accident, or survival by virtue of superior skill, foresight or
industry.84 This interpretation is at odds with basic antitrust theory
which views Alcoa as the strongest structural monopoly case of the last
four decades. 15The Commission suggests the case is an aberration.
Contrary to the Commission's point of view, Alcoa is more often seen as
a case that establishes a basis for structural monopolization prosecutions where certain forms of market projection, and long term planning to deliberately maintain market power may be sufficient to show a
violation of the Sherman Act. 6
After analyzing Alcoa, the Federal Trade Commission found importance in cases such as Berkey Photo Inc. v. EastmanKodak87 and California
ComputerProducts v. IBM Corporation.8 These cases deal with expansion
of the "businessjustification" defense, and are reasonably construed as
"defendant's cases." By the end of the DuPont opinion, the Alcoa case is
treated as an exception to established principle, rather than a seminal
monopoly case. Having thus distinguished Alcoa, the Commission held
that:
[i]t may be that DuPont ultimately will achieve a monopoly share of the
market. As its share increases, other firms may find it harder to capture the
efficiencies enjoyed by DuPont due to the scale economies .... Antitrust
policy wisely disfavors monopoly, but it also seeks to promote vigorous

" 1See n.71.
8 15 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
"s148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa].
81148 F.2d at 431.
5
1 See R. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 3 (1977),
discussing the
consequences of Alcoa, United Shoe, and United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
"'Note, Determination of Administrative Questions in Government Civil Antitrust Suits, 51
COLUM. L. REV. 232,238 (1951); Gross, VerticalIntegrationin Aluminum: A Barto "Effective
Competition," 60 YALE L. REV. 294 (1951).
S7603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1061 (1980).
"613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
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competitive behavior .... that process would be ill-served by using antitrust
to block hard, aggressive competition . . .even if monopoly is a possible
result. 9

The Federal Trade Commission's trend away from structural cases
was confirmed one year after the DuPont opinion. In In the Matter of
Exxon Corporation,the Federal Trade Commission dismissed a proceeding against one of the nation's largest petroleum entities. 90 The Commission characterized the eight-year investigation into the mammoth
corporation as "impracticable," and then weakly suggested that an
antitrust trial in the case could take an additional three years. On this
rationale, the Commission decided to dismiss the proceeding, leaving
an option to reopen at a later date."' Fear of the extensive time required
for antitrust litigation seems a wholly inadequate reason to dismiss a
case against a company of this nature."' In light of the serious nature of
the charges this decision seems to border on an abdication of
responsibility.93
The Exxon case was in a very different posture on October 31, 1980,
when the filing of the "Factual Contentions and Proof" by the staff
reflected forty-six charges against the Exxon Corporation, any one of
which, if proven, may well have been a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Price fixing, gross predatory practices, and erection of insurmountable entry barriers, pervaded the
complaint.94 Quite clearly, the dismissal of this case reflects one of two
things. Either, the Federal Trade Commission feared further budgetary cutbacks, and felt that it could appease certain political interests by
the dismissal of this case; or senior staff at the Commission have,
consistent with the apparent national political direction, shifted away
5
from any form of vigorous government-based regulatory activity.9
The final major Federal Trade Commission decision indicating a
shift in regulatory policy regarding competitive markets is the Cereal
"Dupont, No. 9108 at 750.
"'No. 8934 (F.T.C. 1980), See. n. 71.
9id. at 4.
9"83 F.R.D. 323, 329 (1979); 84 F.R.D. 350 (1979); 88 F.R.D. 47 (1980).

"'The argument that the case became too complex seems illusory, particularly in light
of cases like United States v. AT&T where careful judicial administration and the
judicious of special masters led to an expedited trial and ultimate settlement. 83 F.R.D.
323, 329 (1979); 84 F.R.D. 350 (1979); 88 F.R.D. 47 (1980); judicial Management of the
PretrialProcess in Massive Litigation: SpecialMasters as Case Managers, J. Hazzard & 1.Rice
in

MANAGING

COMPLEX

LIIGATION:

A

PRACTICAL

GUIDE

TO

THE USE

OF

SPECIAL

MASTERS, A.B.A. Foundation (1983).

"Complainant's First Statement of Issues at 84-352, In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934
(F.T.C. 1980).
"To even a casual observer, it should be obvious that the antitrust laws are a vigorous

form of regulation, notwithstanding the fact that they are usually mentioned in an open
market context.
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case, In the Matter of Kellogg Co., General Mills, Inc. and General Foods
Corp." Some considered the Cerealcase an experiment, and belittled its
significance. 7 Nevertheless, the subject of shared monopoly, which lies
at the heart of this case, involves one of the most profoundly difficult
problems in the antitrust field. Three years prior to the Federal Trade
Commission decision, the Justice Department issued a memorandum
on the shared monopoly problem, in which the department announced that it would make a "maximum effort in this area since the
potential benefits to the economy are enormous."98' The Department
believed certain markets would benefit from antitrust enforcement
pursuant to a shared monopoly theory. The Department listed various
information exchange mechanisms, price and product standardization
systems, and other mechanisms that might prevent competition from
functioning effectively. 9 It was not until the Cerealcase, however, that
the administrative law side of antitrust enforcement had an opportunity to rule on shared monopoly. The Cerealcase was to be the opportunity to inform the public of the evolving federal policy regarding the
legitimacy of shared monopoly. The Federal Trade Commission responded to this with the following proposition: "it would serve no
purpose to consider in a vacuum what factual showing, if any, of
industry conduct and performance would constitute a 'shared
monopoly' violation of section 5, and mightjustify an order restructuring an industry. Such a showing has not been made here."'90
While one might not dispute the findings of fact that led to the
outcome, it is difficult to understand why the administrative law judge
was so reluctant to even discuss legal theory. As with the Exxon case,
there are several possible reasons for the judge's reticence to shed any
light on the evolving shared monopoly theory. First, a fear of further
congressional cutbacks in the authority or budget of the Federal Trade
Commission would not be an unrealistic motivation."' Second, the
judge may have been justifiably frightened by cases such as Ford Motor
Company v. FederalTrade Commission"2 which reflect a desire tojudicially
circumscribe the authority of the Federal Trade Commission. Finally,
'No. 8883 (F.T.C. 1981), see supra n.71.
"'Shredded
Litigation, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1981 § A.
8
" Antitrust Division Memorandum on Identification and Challenge of Parallel Pricing
Practices inConcentrated Industries, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (874 at F-i)
(July 27, 1978).
'1d. at F-2.
"'Cereal case, No. 8883 at 265.
0
Statements of James C. Miller, Chairman, U.S. FTC at his first press conference,
October 26, 1981, on file with FTC.
12654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
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thejudge may well have sensed that a change has taken place regarding
the general role of federal competition regulation.""'
There can only be speculation regarding the motivation of the
Federal Trade Commission's decisions in DuPont, Exxon or the Cereal
case. What is not speculative is that three well-developed structural
antitrust proceedings, each reflecting a massive investment in terms of
government personnel, and each reflecting an individual regulatory
ideology of market control, have either been dismissed on the merits or
dropped by the federal agency responsible for the regulatory implementation of the competition system. Unlike much of the earlier material reflecting dissatisfaction in the procedural workings of federal
agencies, these cases reflect a substantive disillusionment and suggest a
need for consideration for different forms of federal intervention.
Ultimately, in trying to pin down what has happened in the last few
years in the regulatory world, we are left with a series of confusing and
disjointed decisions. Contrary to the hopes of some, the clock will not
be turned back to a period of vigorous regulatory intervention with
governmental entities being primary decisionmakers. 4 Quite simply,
major regulatory programs have changed'5 " and there is little reason to
think that "regulatory analysis" will provide a substantial shift in the
success or acceptability of governmental regulation.""'Likewise, implementation of Executive Order No. 12291," '7 will not make regulatory

"03See Comment, Regulatory Reform: Will an Injection of Conpetition Cure the Patient, 52
TUL.4 L. REV. 362 (1978).
1' See Note, NRA Antitrust Review of Nuclear Power, 1980 LAw FORUM 1011, in which the
author posits that antitrust enforcement in the nuclear power field is "becoming an
important forum in which to discuss economic regulation issues." Political reality has
invaded this most sensitive function of the federal government, undertaken pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1976). In May 1981, the number of lawyers enforcing the antitrust laws
at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1976) was reduced
from a staff of twelve to one section chief and two litigating attorneys, all of whom have
responsibilities in other areas in the office of the executive legal director. Moving
personnel away from critical regulatory finctions has become commonplace. See, e.g.,
Internal RIFs, Huge Staff Cut Hint EPS Retreat on Prograwa, Washington Post, Sept. 30,
1981, § A at 1.
55
See n.27.
' 06Hearings on the Regulatory Reform Act Bill: S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 97-284 at
198-200 (1981).
'Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981), requires executive agencies to
submit proposed administrative rules to the Office of Management and Budget for a
cost-benefit analysis. The order requires a determination of the "net benefits" of the rule
(§ 3(d)(4)) both in monetary and nonmonetary terms. The order applies to "major rules"
(§ I(b)) and is designed to allow the Office of Management and Budget to prohibit the
implementation of any rule that appears incapable of paying its own way. See generally
Rosenburg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControl of Agency Rulemaking
under Executive Order 12291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
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operations more effective merely because the Office of Management
and Budget becomes involved in the process. "The OMB staff alone is
not a unique repository of balanced perspective of the national
interest."""8 In light of this change, consideration of alternatives is
appropriate.
D. Potential Antitrust Liability for
Consensual Decisionmaking
Before considering some examples of consensual process, a brief
synopsis of potential antitrust liability seems appropriate. The discussion in section I(c) above suggesting a decline in the intensity of federal
antitrust efforts""' should not be read to mean that those who participate in classical conspiracies, particularly those with price influencing
features, will be saved from the rigors of antitrust scrutiny. Even if the
government chooses to take no action, the availability of private treble
damage actions will present a formidable deterence to certain types of
collective action. Indeed the very process of consensual decisionmaking creates a risk of antitrust liability of sufficient magnitude to call into
question the advisability of the practice in many circumstances."" At a
minimum, the election of consensual decisionmaking as an administrative decisionmaking device ought to be accompanied by either express
immunity, ' ' a strong and convincing implied immunity"' or, if immunity is unclear, an understanding that there is a presumption
against implied immunity. ' If no immunity argument can be made,
then the election ofconsensual decisionmaking must include an understanding of potential antitrust liability for organized collective action.' 4

""Bliss, Flexible FederalAgency Regulation, 8

PEPPERDINE

L. REV. 619, 637 (1981).

""See n. 7 1.
Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 102 S.Ct. 1935 (1982).
'"See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1976), Clayton Act §§ 6,
17 (1976); Clayton Act §§ 20, 52 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10,
113-15
(1976).
"2 Note, AT&T and the Antitrust Laws; A Strict Testfor ImpliedImmunity, 85 YALE L.J. 254,
258 (1975). Keogh v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Gordon v. New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); Cain v. Air Cargo, Inc., 599 F.2d
316, 321 (9th Cir. 1979); Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Motor Carriers Ass'n., Inc., C.A. No.
'"American

79-3134 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. Jan. 26, 1981), reprinted in, [1981]

ANTITRUSr

& TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) (1001 at D-4)(Feb. 12, 1981).

National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross (Kansas City),
452 U.S. 378, 101 S.Ct. 2415 (1981); United States v. Title Insurance Rating Bureau of
Arizona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (D. Ariz. 1981) citing Lafayette v. Lousiana Power
and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978).
"'Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). Berkey Photo v.
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Liability would most likely be for a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act, ' 5 on the premise that meetings of competitors are pre6
sumptively held for the purpose of conspiring to restrain trade."
If express immunity is provided by legislation for identified participants, the only question is whether the activity undertaken is within the
ambit of the immunity." 7 If express immunity is not provided by
statute, several points must be considered. First, if the rule, decision or
agreement that is the end product of the negotiation is to be submitted
to a government agency, that fact alone will not immunize the
process." 8 Further, unless the decisionmaking system and regulatory
review clearly displace open market forces,"' or there is a patent
repugnancy between the operation of the antitrust system and the
regulatory system'20 submittal to a governmental body of a collectively
produced product is not immunized. Finally, if there is an extensive
regulatory program' and if the activity of the parties to the negotiation is compulsory,' an argument can be made that the process should
not be subjected to antitrust scrutiny. It would not be enough to argue
that there is an extensive regulatory program and that compliance
therewith is in the public interest.'2
A different approach to the immunity question is to assert that the
right of petition and associational interests would bejeopardized were
the antitrust laws to impinge on consensual systems where the outcome
of consensual process would be used to effect a governmental
decision.'24 This doctrine has been held expressly inapplicable to intrastate collective ratemaking.'2 Further, the Supreme Court has viewed
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
115
U.S.C. § 1 (1980).
" 6United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683 (1948).
"'Board
of Trade of City of Chicago v. ICC, 646 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1981).
" 8Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See Keogh v. Chicago and N.W.
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
"2 9Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975).
1 U.S. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v.
Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2
1 'Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to RegulatedIndustries, 44 TENN. L. REv.
1, 20-21 (1976); United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694
(1975);
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1082 (N.D. 11. 1978).
'2 2Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
23
' Northeastern Telephone v. AT&T, 497 F. Supp. 230, 250 (D. Conn. 1980).
'24Eastern Ry. Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 127 (1965); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking25Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
' U.S. v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga.

1979); See Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Motor Carriers Ass'n., Inc., n.108.
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the doctrine restrictively'" and general reliance on such assertions is
probably unwise.
Assuming consensual activity is not immunized, collective activity
7
that is price influencing is per se unlawful2 even though there is
28
another perceived beneficial effect of such interaction.' Classical
arguments regarding the need to coordinate or "order" a marketplace
have usually failed' unless it can be proved that there is no demonstrable economic effect'"" or that the discussions involve nonprice
data. '' While not every discussion between competitors which has a
32
price influencing character will be found per se unlawful' particularly
3
if the market practice is being evaluated for the first time, ' 1 escaping
the per se designation provides only the opportunity to demonstrate
that a collective practice is not an unreasonable restraint of trade.
To demonstrate reasonability, it is often necessary to show that the
interaction leaves a margin for subsequent noncollective price
3 5
modification," 4 was accomplished in a "fair and open" manner, or is
36
pressures.'
otherwise needed to maintain more central competitive
' 227See supra n. 122.
' United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v.
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
United
' 2 Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1951); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. McKesson and Robbins, 351 U.S.
310 (1956).
305,
2
1 'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Eilberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d
1068, 1076 (2nd Cir. 1980) (adopting the standard of Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
""Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkeley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1123
(1979), citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
_"'Kreuzer v. American Academy of Peridontology, 516 F. Supp. 1034 (D.D.C. 1981);
Eliason v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
American Society of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 441 U.S. 1,23 (1979);
Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
.. Compare, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); See aiso White Motor Co. v.
United States, 373 U.S. 253 (1963); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
3
' United States v. Am. Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
'Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Coltmbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v.
United States, 258 U.S. 563 (1925); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Sound Ship Building Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 533 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976); United States v. Empire States, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122; Blue Bill Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354
(10th Cir. 1954).
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Those defending the consensual process do not have a simple burden
in a reasonable restraint case; they must show that an open discussion
between horizontally aligned competitors is necessary to facilitate market competition' 7 and is the least restrictive way of accomplishing that
goal. 38 Each consensual decisionmaking process will have this burden,
unless provided with express immunity. Naturally, the more the negotiation topics focus on nonprice data,' 9' on information dissemination
and publication rather than price establishment'" or are perceived as
critical to the provision of a public service"' the greater the likelihood
that such practices will be construed as "reasonable restraints" and thus
lawful.
Parties should not be advised to participate in such systems without
an appreciation of the risk, unless prior case law suggests that the
collective action will be found reasonable, or existing legislation expressly protects parties from antitrust scrutiny. Even in dialogue that is
by any definition nonprice, the risk of market manipulation and potential antitrust consequences is present."'
The discussion above relates to antitrust problems that result from
the inherent nature or structure of consensual decisionmaking. A final
antitrust concern is that parties involved in consensual processes are at
risk, notjust because of the collective structure of such systems, but also
because such systems are capable of being abused by overly aggressive
participants. In American Society of MechanicalEngineers v. Hydrolevel,"
the Supreme Court found that a standard setting group can be liable
for the intentional and covert anticompetitive actions of a few of its
members. Relying on basic agency principals,"' the Court imposed
liability on the consensual group for activity which constituted a secret
conspiracy between two persons to injure a competitor, on the premise
that the conspiracy had been accomplished using the resources and
forum provided by the standard setting body. The case does "not
delineate ..

. the

outer boundaries of the antitrust liability of standard

setting organizations for the actions of their agents committed with
'See Broadcast Music, n.132.
'SSee National Society of Professional Engineers, n. 132.
' See Maple Flooring, n.132.
""'See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 917 (1981).
"Central Iowa Power Co-op v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
'I4 Voluntary Standards and AccreditationAct, 1977: Hearings on S. 827 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., IstSess. 285 (1977).
4
'American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 193 (1982);
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal
Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1329 (1978).
44
' American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 193, (1982).
3
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apparent authority."'415 It does, however, suggest extreme caution in
terms of insuring that consensual systems are well run 4 ' and that the
process of decisionmaking is conducted with a consciousness of potential antitrust risk.

CONSENSUAL DECISIONMAKING SYSTEMS
A. General Categories of
Consensual Systems
There are a number of different existing forms of consensual decisionmaking. The listing below includes only those systems studied,
and is by no means exhaustive. One of the goals of this research is to
encourage expansion of these formats into a more public domain.
The first and most widely used consensual decisionmaking system is
the private standard-setting consensual decisionmaking body. It has no
government reporting obligations or direct government oversight,
although the end product of such groups may be adopted by governmental units.'47 Industry standard-setting groups, such as the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers'48 (ASME) and other similar trade associations have been involved in the formal and informal
promulgation of codes, standards, and guidelines for many years.
ASME is discussed in I(D) of this article and is typical of this class. A
second example of a private standard-setting organization is the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).'49 The NFPA maintains a
highly complex system for the promulgation of fire tolerance standards for building materials and related products.
NFPA is divided into numerous committees which evaluate the
compliance of a particular product with the organizations's safety
codes. An intricate system of appeals, administrative review, public
notice and comment, record keeping, and public access to files, each
with time limitations, is used to reach decisions for new and existing
products. Each decisionmaking group has three parts: one-third industry representatives, one-third fire marshals or other fire safety
specialists and insurance personnel, and a final third drawn from
"'51d. at 347.
"'Id. at 344.
" 7Standards produced by the two groups used as an example of this form of consensual decisionmaking (The American Society of Mechanical Engineers and The National
Fire Prevention Association) are often incorporated into municipal housing codes.
' See supra n. 143.
"'The National Fire Protection Association is headquartered in Batterymarch Park,
Quincy, Massachusetts, with Washington, D.C. offices at 1800 M Street, N.W.
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consumer groups, with interests in both product costs and product
safety. In theory, groups comprised of such divergent interests should
generate well-reasoned and rational decisions regarding product tolerance. This type of balancing increases the potential of interest groups
or "lowest common denominator" standards.
There is periodic criticism of the objectivity and decisionmaking
competence of private groups."' Such decisions are not subject to any
form of agency review or judicial review, with formal legal oversight
limited to antitrust scrutiny regarding the process of decisionmaking 1'
52
or the anticompetitive effects of the decisionmaking
A second category of consensual decisionmaking involves groups
established, usually on an ad hoc basis, with the hope of resolving a
specific public problem affecting many different interests. Such organizations occasionally receive public funding and do not report to any
particular agency. One successful example of a private advisory group
was the New England Energy Congress, sponsored by the New England Congressional Caucus. 5 The New England Congress was
funded by the United States Department of Commerce and the United
States Department of Energy and was designed to develop energy
policy that would reconcile conflicting interests in the field. Efforts
were made to ensure that the Energy Congress was comprised of
membership that represented diverse and conflicting interests.' 51 The
5
' The Technical Committee Documentation of the National Fire Protection Association (Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Nov. 16-19, 1981) lists membership on various committees which have the responsibility to promulgate standards and evaluate products. In
looking at the individual membership lists, it is hard to see the /4 delineation of participant selection mandated by the organization's own rules. However, committee membership is highly diverse and reflective of all appropriate interests, although not always
with the appropriate percentages.
""On fairness see Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); on market
success, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979); Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass'ns, 495 F. Stipp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
'5American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982);
See also Wire Mesh Prods. Inc. v. Wire Belting Ass'n. 520 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Pa.
1981) holding that the mere act of compilation of statistics does not violate the antitrust
laws.3
B See New England Energy Congress, Final Report of the New England Energy
Congress, A Blueprint for Energy Action (197) (available from the New England Energy
Congress, 14 Whitfield Road, Sommerville, Massachusetts 02144).
'The membership of the 1977-1978 New England Energy Congress advisory committee included: the Vice-president of Northeast Petroleum; the vice-president in
charge of energy and transportation of the First Naional Bank of Boston; the president
of Maine Hydroelectric, the director of the energy section of the Rhode Island office; the
energy program director of the New England Regional Commission; the president of the
Northeast Solar Energy Center; a representative of the Department of Energy; a representative from the New Hampshire State Labor Council; the execttive director of
Berkshire-Litchfield Environmental Council; the energy proJect director of the Law
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Energy Congress produced a set of proposals in the energy field many
of which have been implemented at various governmental levels. The
formula for success in this context includes intelligentjuxtaposition of
conflicting interests, provision of a complete opportunity for study and
deliberation and production of proposals within a limited time frame.
Although the proposals represent negotiated compromise of various
positions, this is inherent in any process of public decisionmaking,
5

consensual or otherwise.1 5

The third type of consensual decisionmaking body is the public
advisory board. These groups are created by statute or executive
order, and possess formal recommendation power. Pursuant to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act,'5 6 advisory committees can be created either by the Congress to report to congressional committees, or
by the President, to report to the director of the Office of Management
and Budget; or perhaps to designated individuals within the federal
agency system.' 7 Advisory committees can be formed by congressional
action, presidential mandate or by federal agencies with appropriate
jurisdiction."' The Advisory Committee Act as modified in 1972, was
designed to eliminate unnecessary advisory committees, prevent advisory groups from becoming self-serving, refine decisional tasks for
particular advisory committees, and generally to improve the operation of such groups. 5 There are advisory committees to assist on the
development of aquaculture,5 " to work on problems of juvenile

Income Planning Agency of Hartford, Connecticut; a former secretary of consumer
affairs for the State of Massachusetts; a professor from Tufts University; and the general
manager of Burlington Electric.
B'And the example of such an organization is the Economic Policy Council of the
United Nations Association of the United States of America. The Council's purpose is to
provide a forun for public and private sector interests to debate and decide upon policy
direction for international bodies, to assemble resources to study complex international
economic problems, and ultimately to make recommendations on these issues. The 1978
Economic Policy Council was comprised of the chairman of the board of Atlantic
Richfield; the president of the International Union-United Auto Workers; a professor
from Wellesly College; the president of the University of the District of Columbia; a
director and senior vice-president from Exxon Corporation; consulting economists;
government officials; representatives of various investment firms and banks; and United
Nations personnel. See Economic Policy Council of the United Nations AssociationUnited States of America, The Global Economic Challenge, Volume I: Trade Commodities Flows (1978).
1555 U.S.C.A. § I et seq. (West Supp. 1981); See also Walters, Use of FDA Advisory
Conmmittees: President and Future, 29 Foo DRUG CosM. L.J. 348 (1974).
1575 U.S.C.A. § 5-8 (West Supp. 1981).
"'Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 3 (West Supp. 1981).
'51Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd., 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'""'National Aquaculture Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2803 (West Supp. 1981).
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justice," ' to solve the problems of small business,"' guide the development of solar photovoltaic energy'63 and many others.
In the area of nuclear safety, there are two organizations comprised
of various experts who, on issues of nuclear safety, have different
political postures. The Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee' was
established following the accident at Three Mile Island and consists
exclusively of nongovernmental nuclear power experts. The Nuclear
Safety Oversight Committee reports to the President, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and provides an
annual status report on its investigations and decisions made to address
various presently unresolved safety issues. 65
The Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee is, however, a single incident group. By contrast, the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards'6 is a fifteen-member body, appointed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, which reports regularly to the Commission
on public safety issues in the licensing process. A membership prerequisite is impartiality; members must be free of financial influence or
conflicting employment obligations. They must, in addition, be free of
all Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff involvement.1'7
This particular consensual decisionmaking group exercises responsibility over issues of nuclear power safety involving water-cooled reactors, tolerance capacity of containment vessels, and performance
criteria for the emergency core cooling systems. The Advisory Committee acts as a consensual decisionmaking body with recommendation
powers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The fourth and very different type of consensual decisionmaking
system operates by virtue of congressional delegation of responsibility
to defined groups which may have exclusively private members, or be a
mix of public and private members. Under carefully defined circumstances, the Congress may decide that a statutorily required aspect of
decisionmaking can be best made by an entity other than a federal
agency. For example, the securities exchanges function as collective
"'Juvenile Justice Amendments of' 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5618 (West Supp. 1981).
" 2Exec. Order No. 12,258,3 C.F.R. 305 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,190,3 C.F.R. 136
(1981); Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636 (West Supp.
1981).
"'Solar Photovoltaic Energy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5588 (West Supp. 1981).
'"'Established by Exec. Order No. 12,202,3 C.F. R. 243 (1981), a aimenoded, Exec. Order
No. 12,240, 3 C.F.R. 282 (1980).
5i42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5848, 5849, 5850 (West Supp. 1981).
"'42 U.S.C.A. § 2039 (West Supp. 1981).
""See United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, A Review of NRA Regulatory Processes and Functions, NUREG 0642, Rev.
I at 16 (1981).
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associations, with substantial decisionmaking power exercised in a
consensual format."" Clearing and settlement agencies, as well as exchanges, must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission '
which has oversight responsibility for the exchanges' rules or rate
related determinations. Antitrust problems in varying forms have surfaced because the exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations
require continuous communication between horizontally aligned competitors.
There is no express immunity for the activities of entities in the
securities industry. In United States v. National Association of Securities
Dealers,'7 ' and Gordonv. New York Stock Exchange, 7 ' the Supreme Court
decided that the antitrust laws were repealed by implication. This
implied repeal was only functional to the minimum extent necessary
for the operation exchanges allowing ,7'
those who participate in the
consensual decisionmaking process to discuss and vote upon matters
germane to their industry.'73 The self-regulatory organizations are,
however, restricted to business appropriately before the organizations
pursuant to federal statute and may only operate within the confines of
that restriction.
Antitrust immunity in this consensual decisionmaking context is
justified because these organizations require complex rate and other
market data. In this way, users and investors can best benefit from
optimal market knowledge about the broad range of available services,
meeting the congressional objective of improving real competition in
the securities areas. By establishing a national market system, investors
have access to comprehensive market data permitting investment and
broker selection choices based on something other than conjecture or
incomplete local information."'
The self-regulatory organizations in the securities field operate as
consensual decisionmaking bodies. Their decisions are reviewed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In addition, the SEC
performs fact gathering functions, and regularly reviews decisions
""See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976) on self-regulatory organizations.
"115 U.S.C. § 7 8 q (1976).

' 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
.7'422
U.S. 659 (1975).

72
1 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685, quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
431,
3587 n. 12 (1963).
1 -See Shumate and Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D.
Tex. 1980), defining the scope of the implied immunity provided in the Gordon and
National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers cases: See supra notes 112 and 120.
' 7'See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k (West Supp. 1981),
establishing a national market system with various designated information processors.
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made by the self-regulatory organizations. SEC involvement in the
consensual decisionmaking process is substantial. Indeed, through
case-by-case oversight performed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission is the premise for the maintenance of the implied immu75
nity or repeal of the antitrust laws in this area.
A second example of a system which produces decisions required to
be made by statute is collective ratemaking in the regulated sector of
the transportation industry. Collective ratemaking is permissible only
because of an express immunity. 7" This system is discussed in detail in
II(C) of this article.
This brief description of four different types of decisionmaking
indicates the flexibility and applicability of consensual process for the
development of policy, resolution of day-to-day ratemaking and for
promulgation of technical guidelines or industry standards. It is hoped
that the range of areas where consensual decisionmaking is used is not
confined by this brief listing, but will include more direct government
sponsored negotiation, either as a substitute for rulemaking, adjudication, or to accomplish other "informal" decisional tasks now performed
by federal agencies. The following section describes such a proposal.
B. The Proposal of the Administrative
Conference of the United States
On June 18, 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) adopted recommendation 82-4 by unanimous vote,
"Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations."' 77 The recommendation urges agencies to "consider using regulatory negotiation...
as a means of drafting for agency consideration the text of a proposed
regulation. A proposal to establish a regulatory negotiation group
could be made either by the agency ... or by suggested interested
persons."'78 The proposal is based on the perceived problems of conventional decisionmaking systems. It is the creative and innovative idea
of Phillip Harter, then counsel to the conference.'79
Under the proposal, not every decision an agency makes should be
subjected to the consensus or negotiation process. Instead, once Con7
'See Shumate 486 F. Supp. at 1339; Sloan v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 489 F.2d
I (2d Cir. 1973).
76
"' Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, 804, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 10706(b)(3)(1980).
77
"'
Supra, n.3 (Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendations 82-4, Procedures For Negotiating Proposed Regulations, [hereinafter cited as
ACUS Proposal].

171d. at 2.
'7"See supra n.6.
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gress has authorized an agency to use the consensus model, the agency
will have the authority to decide which matters would be facilitated
by the use of consensual decisionmaking. 80 In deciding whether to
use consensus process, the agency should consider the likelihood
that "consensus process ... would limit output, raise prices, restrict
entry, or otherwise establish or support unreasonable restraints on
competition."'"' Beyond the potential adverse effect on competition
(discussed in I(D)) the Administrative Conference identified the following elements as factors to consider in deciding whether to use
consensus process:
(a) The issues to be raised in the proceeding should be mature and ripe for
decision. Ideally, there should be some deadline for issuing the rule .... '
The requirement of ripeness presumably refers to different factors
than are involved in a judicial jurisdictional assessment of ripeness
factors. It is inconceivable that the ACUS would want concrete legal
issues defined before negotiation commenced. A more reasonable
interpretation would be that the Conference is interested in having
negotiation where the positions of parties have been clearly defined. As
to the matter of a deadline, one of the most beneficial aspects of the
process of consensual decisionmaking is that deadlines can be reasonably imposed. Whether the model is negotiation, as is suggested in the
ACUS proposal, or some other bargaining process, time deadlines
have been present, often with sanctions or compulsory arbitration
being available for failure to comply with such deadlines.
(b) The resolution of issues should not be such as to require participants in
negotiations to compromise their fundamental tenets, since it is unlikely that
agreement will be reached in such circumstances. Rather, issues involving
such fundamental tenets should already have been determined, or not be
crucial to the resolution of the issues involved in writing the proposed
regulation."'
The idea that negotiation should not cause parties to "compromise
their fundamental tenets" is one which may be highly controversial. It
seems likely that parties will never go to negotiation if they can avoid
the give and take process simply by asserting that a fundamental tenet
is at stake. Such disputes may be more difficult to resolve, or may
ultimately require arbitration; however, the negotiation format should
not be so easily compromised.
18 8ACUS Proposal at 2.
81
' ACUS Proposal at 2-3.
'"ACUS Proposal at 3.
1s8Id.
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(c) The interests significantly affected should be such that individuals can
be selected who will adequately represent those interests.., a rule of thumb
might be that negotiations should ordinarily involve no more [than] fifteen

participants.'84

There is little doubt that negotiation can involve significant numbers

of persons, but that if the group becomes too large, it will be unwieldy.
To arbitrarily draw the line at fifteen persons seems unrealistic. For
example, in the collective ratemaking area, negotiation and voting
often includes hundreds of participants. To be sure, the voters in the
collective ratemaking scenario represent only one interest, and therefore the discussions are not highly disputed. However, experience in
other fields might suggest that identification of appropriate interests
constitutes the most serious problem for consensual decisionmaking.
Accordingly, limiting participants without reference to the particular
situation seems unwise. A far greater problem than the number of
participants is interest identification and selection of representations.
In the consumer product safety area, what person or persons should
represent consumer interests; those who are advocates for optimally
safe products, or those whose interests include cost savings and nominal safety? The resolution of such value disputes does not appear to be
at hand.
(d) There should be a number of diverse issues that the participants can
rank according to their own priorities and on which they might reach
agreement by attempting to optimize the return to all the participants."'
There is little disagreement that ranking issues in terms of priorities,
and then eliminating those matters where there is agreement is an
effective form of negotiation. It is ironic that these simple devices have
not been more readily utilized. A good example of such utilization is at
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where disputed
issues are refined through the process of filing "Contentions" and
"Matters in Controversy" during the pretrial stages of NRC licensing
hearings. By identifying disputed issues in advance, time required for
licensing hearings can be reduced.'
(e) No single interest should be able to dominate the negotiations. The
agency's representative in the negotiations will not be deemed to possess this
power soley by virtue of the agency's ultimate power to promulgate the final
rule. 87
1

18 d.

"'5Id.

"I10 C.F.R. 2.714(a)(3)( 1981); Cotter, "NuclearLicensing" Innovation Through Evolution
in Administrative
Hearings, 34 AD. L. REv. 497, 526 (1982).
7
11ACUS Proposal at 3.
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The notion that the federal agency should be a participant in consensual decisionmaking is one in which there is general agreement.
Whether the agency ought to have the "ultimate power to promulgate
the final rule" is a separate question. It is likely that parties will not
negotiate openly and in good faith if they feel that the results of the
negotiation will subsequently be modified or distilled at some future
administrative proceeding.'88 Certainly, in the context of a situation
where negotiation is being substituted for adjudication, some subsequent agency review may be available, but could not be used as a form
of ultimate decisionmaking or veto. If parties are to be expected to
compromise and negotiate, then they must be able to rely on the results
of their negotiation. A better model might be that which is used in the
antitrust field, where settlements are binding on the parties, but must
be approved by a court. If a court determines that a settlement is
inconsistent with the public interest, it is free to reject the settlement,
although the parties will obviously not be held to concessions made in
the negotiation processs.'89
(f) The parties in the negotiations should be willing to negotiate in good
faith to draft a proposed rule.
(g) The agency should be willing to designate an appropriate staff member
to participate as the agency's representative, but the representative should
make clear to the other participants that he or she cannot bind the agency. 90
Two final points from the Conference proposal are worthy of mention. First, the Conference endorses the use of a mediator if it appears
that the situation would be expedited 9 ' by the intervention of some
third party. In implementing a consensual decisionmaking system,
great care must be taken to preserve negotiating power in the individual participants. If power is ceded to a mediator or arbitrator, an
adversary relationship is likely to develop, with all the trappings presently found in adversary systems. Accordingly, if a mediator is used,
they must perform in purely procedural capacity, with no substantive
decisionmaking authority. Similarly, if the role of the arbitrator is to
"unlock a deadlock," great care must be taken that all parties play a role
in the selection of the arbitrator, and agree to be bound by his or her
decision.
Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
L. REV. 1256, 1347 (1981).
'..See 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50137 (1980); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas. Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); United States v. Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d 113
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F.
Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
'1 ACUS Proposal at 3.
"lid. at 4.
"
CAL.
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A second point of interest is that the Conference endorses unanimous consent in consensual decisionmaking. They define consensus as
meaning that "each interest represented in the negotiating group
concurs in the result, unless all members of the group agree at the
outset on another definition."'92 Unanimous consent in negotiation
may well mean a "lowest common denominator result."'93 However, it
also means an increase in the likelihood of compliance and, a reduction
in enforcement costs. While this proposal might seem controversial, it
is absolutely essential to consensual decisionmaking. If parties leave a
consensual negotiation without agreeing to the result of the negotiation, the negotiation has failed and the benefits of consensual process
will be lost.
C. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the
Interstate Commerce Commission: The Collective
Ratemaking Process as an Example of
Consensual Process
Collective ratemaking is a form of consensual decisionmaking used
in the trucking industry to produce tariffs. Carriers meet with shippers
in the rate bureaus, discuss all components of cost, and then vote on
proposed rate increases or decreases. '
The rates are submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission
and, if approved, are published by carriers.'95 Rate bureaus provide a
forum where single line and joint line rates are discussed, ultimately
resulting in published tariffs" which can be followed, modified within
a "zone of reasonable fares" through subsequent negotiation between
carriers and shippers,'97 or not followed, having independently negotiated rates set based on market demand.'98 Such bureaus are required to
file an "agreement" with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
which sets out the parameters of permissible conduct for members of
bureaus, detailing the voting process, notice procedures and all other
operational matters.'" If such agreements are approved by the ICC,
92
'1
1d. at 4-5.
'A logical tendency for negotiating parties will be to pursue a rule or standard which
is the least restrictive from the perspective of all parties. This might sacrifice statutorily
designated policy objectives, and is a tendency which merits close scrutiny.
"'94Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793,803,49 U.S.C.A. 10706
(1980).
"'Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, 803 et seq. July 1, 1980,
49 U.S.C. 10706(a)) (1980).
"9649 U.S.C. § 10706 (1976).
19749 U.S.C. § 10708 as amended (West. Supp. 1982.).
9849 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3)(B) ii (West. Supp. 1982).
19949 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3) (West Supp. 1982.).
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"parties and other persons" who participate in the ratemaking process
enjoy an immunity from the antitrust laws"0 so long as that activity does
20
not exceed the limits of the agreement. '
This system of ratemaking allows carriers to meet on a regular basis,
discuss cost information and vote on individual or class price changes
in a manner which, outside of the grant of express immunity, would be
a violation of the antitrust laws. 0 2 The process permits carriers to
receive information regarding complex transit options, pricing combinations, and to participate directly in decisionmaking. The system
provides an opportunity for shippers to contribute information to
voting carriers, but does not permit direct shipper voting. The system
is consensual in form, and as such merits serious attention.
The Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission has been studying the merits of collective ratemaking since 1981, seeking to determine whether the antitrust immunity provided for collective ratemaking should continue.2 °0 The Study Commission conducted hearings
throughout the United States over a twelve-month period, taking
testimony from hundreds of witnesses on the immunity question,
holding its final meeting December 9, 1982.204 That meeting resulted in
2 5
a tie vote on the question of the maintenance of antitrust immunity.
The effect of this deadlock is that immunity now provided for singleline ratemaking will end on January 1, 1984 unless further congressional action is taken.2 0° The difficulty in reaching a decision on
immunity in part reflects the dilemma inherent in consensual decisionmaking: most consensual systems require an interchange between
horizontally aligned competitors giving rise to highly beneficial exchanges of information and concommitantly to the opportunity for
20 7
price fixing and other conspiratorial transgressions of antitrust law.
2049

(1976).
2

U.S.C. § 10706(b)(2) (1976); 3 49 U.S.C. 10708(d)(4) (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 10741

°Atchinson, Topeka and Sante Fe Ry v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877 (1958),
cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 930 (1960).
2
1 Georgia v. Pennsylvania 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), United States v. Container Corp. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
2049 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(F)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
2
0°4Open Hearings of the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission, 12/9/82,
Washington,
D.C. (Public transcript not released at date of publication.)
2 5
1 The Commission was comprised of six congressional members and four independent White House Appointees. (Congressmen Shuster, Seiberling and Roe, Senator
Cannon and appointee Murphy voted to retain immunity, while Senators Packwood and
Kennedy and appointees Thometz, Edler and Warren voted to eliminate immunity.
Under Commission rules, the 5-5 vote resulted in no recommendation to the Congress.)
'0649
U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(D). (West Supp. 1981).
2 7
1 American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, Inc., 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982)).
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The value of any consensual system must be weighed against the risks
that such systems pose to the competitive marketplace. For collective
ratemaking, that balancing has been effected by the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980,28 which changed the competitive dynamics in the industry
by liberalizing entry requirements 0 9 and opening up the bureau
process.1 °
The act mandates a number of changes in rate bureau process, while
clarifying other procedural matters. In looking at the "sunshine" requirements of the act, the arguments regarding shipper participation,
proxy control, the procedural and substantive restrictions on bureau
interference with independent action, a picture begins to form of a
controlled but functional consensual decisionmaking system.2 1' On the
downside, the system does not permit shippers to vote, and restricts
voting to only carriers actually participating in the route and commodity in question. 212 If collective ratemaking is a onesided process, excluding shipper interests and likewise excluding participation by other
indirectly affected groups, then the charge that the collective ratemaking process is flawed by the negative factors of other cartel-like systems
becomes difficult to defend.
Shipper participation issues involve several unanswered questions:
first, will there be a need for antitrust immunity for collective shipper
input;2 31 second, is shipper participation meaningful in terms of ultimate results of collective ratemaking; finally, since transportation costs
are passed on to consumers and since negotiations between shippers
and carriers in a consensual decisionmaking process directly effect
those costs, do the bureaus provide an adequate opportunity for consumer involvement. Under a pure consensual decisionmaking model,
the ultimate decisionmaking body must consist of the various identifiable interested parties who have a stake in the outcome. This would
appear to compel inclusion of shippers if the system is to be defended
as a consensual system. However, since legislative attention has been
focused on the question of immunity, the issue of direct shipper
24
participation did not become part of the debate before the Congress.
It must be understood that the collective ratemaking process was not
set up to be a multi-interest participatory forum. Instead, until 1975 it
2049

U.S.C. § 10101 (1981), Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat 793 (1980).

20949 U.S.C.A. § 10922 (West Supp. 1981), Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.

96-296, 94 Stat. 793, 794 (1980).
2 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (1981), Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat.
793, 803 (1980).
21'Id
.
22

1d.
"Manderville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
449 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(F)(B)(I) (West Supp. 1981).

2
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was a fairly closed system which provided carriers a forum for ratebased dialogue. From 1975 forward, congressional attention became
focused on the trucking industry, causing the bureaus to begin to
reconsider their composition.2 ' The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, with
the "openness" modifications now mandated, is the first major step in
the process. 211 It may well be that the final steps will include even
greater openness in the process, guaranteeing participation by a variety of directly affected interests, beyond shippers and carriers.
The antitrust immunity in the Motor Carrier Act extends to carriers
and "other persons" participating in the collective ratemaking process
for discussion of rates. However, the Act prohibits discussions on rates
docketed which are within the zone of reasonable fares but which are
filed within the bureau system.2 7 Presumably, this is done to permit
carriers and shippers to privately negotiate a modified rate without the
peer pressure of the bureau membership. Similarly, the Act prohibits
discussions on released rates on the theory that individual negotiations
are not a matter for the consensual process.2 8 The use of independent
action, released rates or pricing within the twenty percent zone reflect a
kind of price flexibility in no way characteristic of a cartel. When this is
coupled with the free flow of information on a broad range of subjects
relevant to the industry, the elements required for effective competition are present.
As noted above, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 will prohibit collective deliberation on single-line rates afterJanuary 1, 1984. Since singleline ratemaking is not the type of rate variation inherent in independent action, released rates, or zone of reasonableness pricing, the
reasons for prohibition of such discussion must be closely examined. If
the flow or exchange of information required for intelligent rate
decisionmaking is adversely affected by the loss of data which would
surround single-line dialogue, then the prohibition should not go into
effect. Further, the consensual process must actively consider the "inte2

"See, e.g., Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearingson S. 1400 Before the

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Economic
Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearings on S 2245 Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation,96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980); Examining CurrentConditions in the
Trucking Industry and the Possible Necessity for Change in the Manner and Scope of its Regulations: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation,and the Committee of Commerce, Science and Transportation,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
21649 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b), as amended 1980 (West Supp. 1981).
21749 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(c) (West Supp. 1981).
2 849 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(c) (West Supp. 1981); 49 U.S.C.A. § 10730(b) (West Supp.
1981).
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grated transportation network, 2 9 and that requires an awareness of
single-line rates.
It is not logical to exclude dialogue on single-line rates if the premise
therefore is the stimulation of individual negotiation. The market
options now available make such negotiations the norm, not the exception. A more likely consequence of the prohibition of single-line rates is
the suppression of important data, required to make intelligent jointline decisions.. Again, the competition neutralizing effect of dialogue
between horizontally aligned competitors is balanced against improved
compliance, enforcement, reduced administrative costs and the opportunity to make intelligent judgments which can enrich the competitive
vigor of the market.
To counter the risks of bureaus in interfering with price competition, the Motor Carrier Act220 reaffirms the notion that rate bureaus
cannot interfere with carrier independent actions.' Further, carriers
can elect between having independent actions noticed to other competitive carriers or have the bureaus assist in the filing of independent
actions, with no notice to competitive carriers.222 Bureau employees are
prohibited from divulging the existence of carrier instructions regarding independent actions. 2 By permitting independent action filings,
and guaranteeing that such actions can be done in a private manner
(paralleling open market pricing) the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 insures the continuation of open market alternatives.
Similarly the act prohibits bureaus from protesting tariff items of
any carrier, and prohibits bureau employees from "acting on" any
11
The National Transportation Policy Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West Supp. 1982)
requires a "transportation system" (§(a) which permits the transportation of products
from origin to destination, a phenomenon that often requires more than one carrier.
Intra-city and shorthaul operators must coordinate operation with longhaul carriers to
ensure efficient transportation. This notion of a "network" of carriers requires the use of
single and joint line rates.)
"049 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1981).
21In Hayden, Teamsters, Truckers, and the ICC: A Politicaland Economic Analysis of Motor
CarrierDeregulation, 17 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 123, 141 (1980), the author states that because
bureau membership is voluntary, and because of the ability of free and unrestrained
independent action, "rate bureaus lack the power to enforce any price agreements. The
lack of price competition in trucking is thus routed elsewhere and could be largely
unaffected by repealing Reed-Bulwinkle." Further, current statistics indicate an independent action rate in excess of 65%. These statistics are maintained by Eastern Central
Motor Carrier's Association in 1980-81, following the Continuous Traffic Study and are
available from ECMCA, P.O. Box 3600, Akron, Ohio 44310. With two out of every three
shipments travelling under an individually negotiated rate, the significance of collective
ratemaking shifts. Rather than having a cartel-like price pegging effect, the bureau rates
are used as a basis for negotiation in what has become a highly competitve market.
22249 U.S.C.A. § 10706(B)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1981).
22349 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(B)(IV) (West Supp. 1981).
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tariff filing. 24 This insures that the actual decisionmakers, the carriers,
are not unduly inhibited by the professional bureau staff. However,
the act does not prohibit the, provision of advice and analysis or opinions regarding rate filings. Thus, market data is provided to facilitate
intelligent pricing actions without nonparty interference.
In evaluating whether to retain immunity for collective ratemaking,
the inquiry must go beyond general attitudes on competition. An
equally important question is whether the ICC can handle the oversight which is a fundamental counterpart to a grant of antitrust immunity. The capacity of the agency to function is central to the election
of any regulatory consensual system.
Certain policy and role questions plaguing the ICC were eased by the
passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Quite clearly, the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 liberalized entry, simplified ICC decisionmaking
processes, and profoundly changed the process and use of collective
ratemaking. In terms of entry, the Commission has already begun the
task of defining appropriate criteria. Prior to the passage of the act, the
Novak 25 criteria were appropriate for such determinations. However,
the ICC quickly abandoned the Novak criteria in Pre-Fab Transit Co.
Extension-Nationwide General Commodities226 in which the Commission
sought to articulate the means by which an applicant demonstrates
useful public purpose, transportation needs and service demands.
The validity of the "reinterpretation" of entry standards is subject to
some question. For example, in Labar's Inc. Extension-Mountaintop
Insulation2 v the Commission held that if an applicant makes a prima
facie case showing compliance with the facial entry requirements of the
act, a protesting party will not have made a successful case by showing
the availability of adequate existing service. This decision perplexed
Commissioner Clapp, who first agreed that an increase in competition
in the motor carrier industry satisfied a valid purpose. However, he
went on to say that the decision exceeds the bounds of reason when it
asserts that not even bankruptcy-and the resulting loss of service of
existing competing carriers-is sufficient to show
an explicit connection between harm to carriers and harm to the public....
[I]s the majority saying there are no circumstances under which we will
protect a competing carrier and that sole criterion for entry is the prima facie
case? If so, then the concept of the protested proceeding-which I might

U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(B)(III) (West Supp. 1981).
Novak Contract Carrier Application, 103 M.C.C. 555 (1967).
226132 M.C.C. 409 (1981).
27132 M.C.C. at 263 (1980). (Commissioner Clapp concurring in part and dissenting in
22449

225

part).
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note [has] been retained in the 1980 Act-is a charade which wastes everyone's time and resources. '
Further criticism of the commission's efforts at reinterpretation of
standards is found in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, ' a case discussed earlier in I(B) of this article.
There the court found the Commission's actions inconsistent with
statutory intent as well as in contravention of explicit statutory
provisions.23 ' While the decision of the Fifth Circuit condemns the
Commission for a variety of interpretive errors, the decision should not
be read as a condemnation of the regulatory decisionmaking process.
The Motor Carrier Act is a complicated piece of legislation which
leaves open a variety of interpretive problems in the entry field. The
concept of "useful public purpose '"3' is no more easily defined than was
"public convenience and necessity" under the prior legislative
regime.2
In terms of collective ratemaking and the ICC, the picture is unclear.
While the Commission has been capable of preventing price discrimination and insuring a degree of rate reasonability, it has not played an
active role in rate practice and tariff formulation.2 33 However, the
Commission plays an effective role in approval and periodic monitoring of the operating agreements of rate bureaus, suggesting that it is
capable of oversight.234 In the final analysis, it would seem that retention of immunity for collective ratemaking is justified, so long as the
basic fairness components of consensual process are met.
D. Agency Examples
In the process of preparing this research, legal proceedings in several federal regulatory agencies were examined to determine the extent to which consensual decisionmaking is used. Comparison between
2 28

La Bar's, Inc., Extension-Mountaintop Insulation (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.); No. MC-124,
920
(Sub. No. 14), Oct. 17, 1981 Federal Carrier Cases 47, 736, 47, 743.
22
American Trucking Ass'n v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1981).
23
1d. at 469.
23149 U.S.C.A. § 10521 (West Supp. 1981).
23
The supposition that administrative agencies can ever function without constant
review and revision of regulatory policy is unrealistic. See Jaffee, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1973) in which Professor Jaffee finds that the
political forces invariably modify the effectiveness of administrative agencies, that delegations to agencies are rarely, if ever, sufficiently clear, and that public expectations
regarding the "public interest" are simply out of line with the inherent capacity of federal
agencies.
23
Draft of the Report of the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission, Issued
12/9/82,
at p. 14, Washington, D.C.
23
" E.g., in Ex Parte No. 6-MC-297 (sub. No. 3 and sub. No. 4), Reopening of Section 5a
Applications, 1978-1079 the Commission took massive evidence evaluating the results
and procedures of several major bureaus.
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agencies, however, became most difficult, due to diverse regulatory
directives. Similarly, the lack of parallel market factors, from industry
to industry, was most evident. Since market efficiency parallels are
heavily dependent on common entry phenomena, capital availability,
existing regulatory structures, existing market diversity, concentration
ratios, service demands, availability of market information and inventory information, and further since these factors differ in most respects, industry to industry, it was impossible to make general conclusions. Indeed, one of the major shortcomings of the deregulation
debates during the late 1970s has been constant comparisons on an
industry by industry basis where such parallels are illogical. For example, to compare on a market efficiency basis the airline industry which
is an oligopoly with less than thirty major participants with the motor
freight common carrier industry, which has more than 17,000 participants, makes little sense.
The case studies that follow are, of necessity, extremely brief. They
are in no way intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory
programs involved, but only a brief "snapshot" of certain phases of the
regulatory programs of these agencies.
1. The Consumer Product
Safety Commission
In the area of health and safety regulation, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) has been directed by the Congress to utilize consensual decisionmaking systems and voluntary industry standards in a broad and all-encompassing manner.23 ' The 1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act 36 endorse sweeping
changes in the use of voluntary industry standards and require the
CPSC to seek formulation and compliance with such standards, prior
to the initiation of more formal proceedings by the CPSC. The 1981
amendments modify procedural requirements for rulemaking,2 3' require the Commission to conduct cost/benefit analyses,"" require the
preparation of a regulatory analysis under certain delineated
circumstances2 39 along with various procedural mechanisms designed
to expedite the rulemaking and adjudicatory process, or circumvent
that process where voluntary industry standards are available. The
11515

U.S.C.A. § 205b(b) (West Supp. 1981).

29615 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976), as amended by Consumer Product Safety Amendments of

1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 703 (1981).
21115 U.S.C.A. § 2058 (West Supp. 1981).
2381d.
23915 U.S.C.A. § 2058 (F)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
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amendments also provide for a congressional veto, 2 0 and mandate the
utilization of voluntary industry standards. 24' These amendments are
designed to substantively restrict the activities of the CPSC in the area
of lawn mower hazards 242 and amusement park rides." 3
In opting for the use of voluntary industry standards and in expediting and limiting the use of rulemaking, adjudication and implementation of mandatory bans, the Congress has expressed a direct
preference in favor of undisciplined and unchecked consensual decisionmaking. The amendments do not provide guidance for the formulation of industry standards and essentially remove the CPSC from
critical components of the decisionmaking process. Rather than working in conjunction with various product safety standard programs, or
being a participant in a consensual decisionmaking system, the CPSC is
relegated to the role of an observer with vigorous participation restrictions.
While the use of voluntary industry standards and consensual decisionmaking is critical to the position taken in this research, this article
should not be read as an endorsement of undisciplined and purely
private industry standard development with no obligatory agency
oversight. Particularly in the area of health and safety, the reliance on
generalized voluntary standards with no reference to participants,
interests, process and similar matters within the consensual decisionmaking group appears to be a direct repudiation of prior congressional
mandates favoring product safety.
When these procedures are viewed in conjunction with a reduction
of more than thirty percent in the operating budget of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission244 , the purpose of the Congress becomes
quite clear. The amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act of
1981 are designed to restrict the involvement of the federal government in the formulation and implementation of mandatory product
safety standards. Moreover, if the thesis underlying these procedural
and substantive changes involves a preference for "open market economics," then the legislators have been sorely misled regarding the role
of competition in terms of product safety. There is no reason to think
that the elimination of regulation regarding product safety will somehow result in a vigorous competitive market which will produce lessexpensive, high-quality products.
14015 U.S.C.A. § 2084 (West Supp. 1981).
241115 U.S.C.A. § 2054 (a) (West Supp. 1981).
24
1 Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1212, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
24315 U.S.C.A. § 2052 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
244
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, Salariesand Expenses: Hearings on H.R. 4034
Before the House Comm. On Appropriations,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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It may be that thejurisdictional modifications enumerated above are
more the consequence of the budget reconciliation process than of any
other specific substantive goal. At the present time, the Budget Act,
which establishes a standing committee on the budget in each House, 45
requires a coordination of expenditure actions by the Congress. 246 The
act also establishes the Congressional Budget Office 47 which is designed to again coordinate congressional expenditures. During the
97th Congress, the reconciliation process coordinated by the Budget
committee significantly affected the 1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act. Subject matter and fiscal revisions took
place in order to achieve a budget compromise, rather than have those
modifications occur based on a sound assessment of the ongoing capacity of the CPSC to carry out its legislative mandate.24 Parenthetically, if
the reconciliation process is being used to carry out what members of
Congress perceive as a political mandate to "get the government off the
people's back" based on the 1980 election, it is likely that the members
have misread the actual interests of their constituents in terms of
important economic and health and safety regulatory programs. In
terms of the foregoing statement, a survey published on November 10,
1981 indicates that only 12 percent surveyed felt the CPSC was doing
too much, while 41 percent felt the Commission ought to increase its
regulatory activities, with the remainder either uninformed or
agreeing that the Commission was performing adequately. 249
In terms of the administrative procedures used by the CPSC, as
already noted, the amendments to the 1981 act are an attempt to
simplify the promulgation of consumer product safety rules. Prior to
the passage of the 1981 amendments, the CPSC sought to expedite its
procedures, following liberalized but logical standards of administrative practice.251 A system was evolving which allowed the Commission
latitude to respond expeditiously when there was notice given of a
seriously dangerous product, as well as opportunities for the Commission to conduct more relaxed inquiries where the degree of risk was
less than imminent. When the Commission acted without an appropri1301, 1302 (1976).
The CongressionalBudget Process; A GeneralExplanation, HearingsBefore House Comm.
on the Budget, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
24731 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
241531 U.S.C. §
216

2481d.
249

See Overregulation?Public Finds Agencies Not Guilty, The Washington Post, Nov. 10,
1981
at A 18.
25
'Toy Manufacturers of America Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 630 F.2d
70 (2d Cir. 1981).
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ate basis, courts were quick to remand to the Commission for additional fact finding."5 ' Further, where the Commission failed to follow
either its own procedural requirements or those required by the Administrative Procedure Act, a remedy was available in the federal
252
district court.
It is difficult to predict the consequences of the 1981 amendments to
the Consumer Product Safety Act. While it has been argued that the
new procedures will restrict the implementation of product safety
standards by both the Commission and the courts252 it is more likely
that the courts will continue to refine both the procedures utilized by
the Commission and those products subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. 21 Certainly, courts have displayed an ability to define
which voluntary systems are acceptable 5 and to define the extent to
2 6
which commissioners can delegate responsibilities to staff members
or utilize private industry standards as a "product safety standard." In
the Southland Mower case25 7, the Fifth Circuit held that a private industry standard which has been promulgated without participation, input
or guidelines from the Consumer Product Safety Commission cannot
be used, by itself, to support a Commission regulation.2 5 Unfortunately, it would appear that the thrust of the Southland case is offset,
both in terms of the acceptability of purely voluntary standards under
the 1981 amendments, as well as in terms of the specific subject matter
restrictions regarding mower safety in the 1981 amendments. 59
Regarding the formulation of voluntary standards, the 1981 amendments require the Commission to provide "reasonable assistance" to
private industry groups which are seeking to promulgate standards,

and to advise them on the appropriate timing for decisionmaking,
methods of providing notice, and information regarding compliance
25

Aqua Slide 'n' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831,844 (5th
Cir. 1978).
...
Dow Chemical U.S.A. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n., 459 F. Supp. 378 (W.D.
La.,5 1978).
1 'Krulwich, The Negative Practice Effects of Regulatory Reform Legislation, NAT'L L. J.,
June 30, 1980 at 31.
254
See, e.g., ASG Industries, Inv. v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n., 593 F.2d 1323
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Barrett Carpet Mills Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n., 635 F.2d
29955(4th Cir. 1980).

1 National Ornament and Electric Light Christmas Ass'n. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n.,
526 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1975).
256
Relco, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n., 391 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
25
17Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n., 619 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.
1981).
2"Id. at 510.
2
51Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1212, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
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systems and similar matters. 6 ' In addition, the Commission is to see
that the anticompetitive aspects of standards are kept to a minimum. 6 '
It is quite possible that if the Commission takes seriously its responsibility to provide guidance to industry standard-setting groups, some of
the deficiencies mentioned above will be eliminated. For example,
there is nothing expressly prohibiting the Commission from playing
an aggressive role in working with various industry standard-setting
groups, and providing assistance in the establishment of enforcement
and compliance programs. In this context, the Commission would play
an advisory role to private industry standard-setting groups, and
would not be certifying these groups' performance, as is done by the
ICC in the collective ratemaking area. It would be worthwhile to
compare the effectiveness of the voluntary system established by the
1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the more
rigorous compulsory controls established to guide collective ratemaking pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.62
Perhaps because the lobby in favor of vigorous consumer protection
is ineffective, the 1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety
Act include a number of provisions which embody concepts growing
out of the economic deregulation arguments of the late seventies. As
already mentioned, the use of consensual decisionmaking as a substitute for governmental decisionmaking is one such reform both endorsed in this testimony, and adopted in the amendments.2 6 The act
also adopts a Congressional veto, a measure that appears to be both
unwise and unwieldy.264 The amendments embody the use of a chronic
hazard advisory pane 2 65 which may prove quite effective as a means for
identifying long-term product risks.
Looking specifically to the use of voluntary industry standards, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission has always considered as a
260 15

U.S.C.A. § 2056 (b) (West Supp. 1981) requires that the CPSC utilize appropriately

drawn voluntary standards. Prior practice made use of such standards voluntary and

subject to the discretion of the agency. (Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 703 (1981)). The
procedures for this compulsory adherence to voluntary standards are set out in 15 U.S.C.
2058(b)(1)
and (2). (95 Stat. 704 (1981)).
2 1
1 See COSC Reauthorizedfor Two Years, Regulatory Action Network, Washington Watch,
at
6 (Sept 1981).
216'49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1981).
26315 U.S.C.A. § 2054(a) (West Supp. 1981).
215 U.S.C.A. § 2083 (West Supp. 1981). In Dixon, The CongressionalVeto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978) and Bruff& Gellhorn,
CongressionalControlof Administrative Regulation:A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1369 (1977), the case is well made for the limited use of the legislative veto. The use
of the veto in the act is a reflection of congressional distrust of existing decisionmaking at
the CPSC, though it is at best a cumbersome and expensive check.
26515 U.S.C.A. § 2077 (West Supp. 1981).
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decisional option, voluntary standards in addition to internally-set
standards, but only when those standards were reviewed and found to
be adequate and reasonable.266 The Consumer Product Safety Commission has been considered an agency with "the greatest potential of
any existing federal regulatory agency for utilizing and participating in
'
the development of voluntary standards." 67
Prior to the passage of the
act, the Commission frequently "denied petitions for mandatory standards on the ground that voluntary standards existed that appeared
adequate and that were generally adhered to by the industry." 66 There
is little question that the agency can use voluntary standards in an
effective way, after passage of the 1981 amendments, if the political
climate allows for appropriate oversight and review of industry standards.
It is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from the case study of
the Consumer Product Safety Commission. While the activities of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, particularly the 1981 amendments, reflect a strong preference in favor of negotiated or consensual
decisionmaking systems, the amendments are imprecise regarding the
methodology of formulating voluntary standards, allowing various
standard-setting groups to perform their functions in an infinite variety of ways. In terms of competition affected by the formulation of
voluntary standards, in the economically sensitive area of product
safety development, Congress felt comfortable in endorsing consensual decisionmaking systems with a simple admonition to use
means that create the least restrictions on competition. 69 Rigorous
standards have an absolute effect on the cost of production. To characterize these negotiations as exclusively "health and safety" oriented,
and to justify the lack of competitive concern based on the fact that this
is a "noneconomic" area would be illogical.
The process of establishing product tolerance criteria is as economically sensitive in many ways as is the process of establishing rates for
transportation services. The risks of improper collusion between competitors is equally great in both areas. However, since it is clear that the
2

"Compare 16 C.F.R. § 1105, with 16 C.F.R. § 1032 (implementing the 1981 amendments).
267
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
FederalStandardsAffecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1399 (1978).
'Id. at 1405. For an outstanding description of the history of the use of voluntary
standards at the Consumer Product Safety Comm'n prior to the 1981 amendments, the
Hamilton article is without parallel. As a guideline for the future, the Hamilton article
will only be of relevance if the Commission adopts avigorous attitude regarding product
safety.

26915 U.S.C.A. § 2058(f)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1982).
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main purpose of collective ratemaking involves assisting in the evolution of a pricing structure, a matter considered traditionally to be at
odds with antitrust policy, immunity is required for collective ratemaking. In contrast, evolution of product standards has been treated
differently under the antitrust system, since the primary purpose
relates to product tolerance and safety standards, and not to pricing
practices. For that reason, industry standard-setting in the product
safety area does not appear to require antitrust immunity.
2. Airline Regulation
The process of consensual decisionmaking evident in collective ratemaking in the trucking industry is discussed in II(C) of this research.
That process is often compared to various activities in the airline
industry. However, "[b]ecause there are fundamental differences between the two industries, one cannot properly be used to justify the
other. It is more logical to compare the probable effects of deregulation of the trucking industry with the effects of deregulation in the air
cargo industry." 7 ' Even in the cargo area it would seem the market
parallel is only marginally inferential. 7' Since there are approximately
17,000 motor freight common carriers in the trucking industry and
less than thirty significant air carriers in the airlines industry, market
comparisons are simply not meaningful. 72
There may, however, be a few lessons to be learned from looking at
present problems in the airline industry, and ascertaining whether
those problems have been brought on by the elimination of consensual
systems, by the continuation of unwise regulatory programs or by open
market forces.173 While the majority of the debate regarding airline
deregulation centers on the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), it seems
appropriate to discuss both the CAB and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) since the FAA is increasingly involved in direct
economic regulation.
In selecting an open market approach in the airline industry, Congress consciously decided to allow market forces to become the primary
determining factor for most choices to be made in the evolution of the
27
Ogborn, The Impact of Deregulation of the Trucking Industry, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1,
2927(1979).
1
See Street, Airport Access, Paper Delivered to the American Bar Ass'n Seminar on
Deregulation
and Antitrust: the Airline Experiment at 8 (Oct. 20-21, 1980).
2 72
1 See Statement of Robert E. Smith, before the Study Commission (Dec. 10, 1981).
22
For an assessment of predicted "ripple effects" in the trucking industry, based on
empirical analysis, rather than a political analysis, see Cavinato & Kogan, An Assessment of
the Impactsfrom Partialand FullRepeal of Section 10706 (Antitrust Immunity) Upon the Motor
CarrierIndustry and its Users, 47 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 427 (1980).
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airline industry."' Presumably, this choice has been predicated on a
careful assessment of the airline industry, evaluated against objective
7
standards for regulating, or not regulating, the airline market. 1
One of the interesting effects of the Airline Deregulation Act has
been a shifting of emphasis from the activities of the Civil Aeronautics
Board regarding conduct limitations, to the Federal Aviation Administration. The chronic and recurrent problems of slot allocations and
noise control provide an interesting example. It may well be that these
"noneconomic" regulatory problems will take on a different dimension, and be used as a modest substitute for the kind of entry and
cost-control activities undertaken by the Civil Aeronautics Board prior
to the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act.2 76 Regarding slot allocation, it was recently held that a local access or use-limiting control plan
at a California airport could not be implemented, despite the fact that
the airport was not suited to accommodate the demands of various
carriers seeking landing rights.2 77 Based on the theory underlying the
Deregulation Act, the court found that the proposed plan for slot
allocation was too limiting, and enjoined its implementation. The case
is significant because it is among the first to confine the right of airport
proprietors "to limit access on grounds other than noise or nature of

se rv ic e s.

. . ,,278

In light of the fact there is only a limited amount of air space and
various capacity restrictions (including the 25 percent service reduction caused by the controllers' strike) it seems that the open market may
274

The vigor underlying this decisional preference is revealed in two Civil Aeronautics
Board cases which came close to complete abdication of statutory responsibility. See
Proposed Rules Regarding International Rate Flexibility, No. 37, 444, PSDR-65 gan.
14, 1980), as clarified by Order 80-9-146, No. 32, 660 (adopted Sept. 24, 1980) and
Complaint of Costha, et al., Against Search Chargesfor HazardousShipments, Order 70-9-189
(filed
by Seaboard World Airlines et al.).
175 Report of the Congress Filed by the Comptroller General of the United States,
Government Regulatory Activity: Justifications,Processes, Impacts and Alternatives, PAD77-34
(Filed June 3, 1977), in which the comptroller isolates ten factors which from the market
perspectivejustify continuation of regulation. They are: "Natural monopoly, resulting in
high prices, reduced output and excessive profits; interdependencies in natural resource
extraction ... resulting in the inefficient use of resources and inequitable sharing of costs;
inadequate information in the marketplace, resulting in poor decisions and wasted
resources; externalities.., resulting in waste for use of resources and unfair costs shifting
to third parties; ... destructive competition, resulting in chronically sick firms unable to
satisfy consumer demand; ...[and social policy objectives such as] alter the distribution
of income; enhance national security; allocates scarce resources; provides service to small
communities;
and advance macroeconomic policy objectives." Note 264 at ii-iii.
276
1 See Lempert, Airport Case Shows How DeregulationMay Change Legal Work, Legal
Times
of Washington, Oct. 5, 1981 at col. 1,p. 1, regarding slot allocation.
277
Pacific SouthWest Airlines v. County of Orange, No. 81-3248 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
278
" Lempert, supra n.276, at 7.
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not be the best system for the allocation of this particular scarce
resource. To resolve slot allocation problems, "[a]t most airports, airlines take advantage of a CAB granted antitrust immunity that allows
'scheduling committees.' Such committees of carriers operate on a
consensus basis, and problems arise ....when a group fails to reach an
agreement acceptable to all."27 9 Such consensus decisionmaking systems, when deadlocked, are presently resolved by the Federal Aviation
Administration, with judicial review available.
Where such consensual decisionmaking is unavailable, as was the
case in California, the regulatory problems become exceedingly difficult and raise the question of the appropriate role of the FAA as an
economic regulatory body. Recently, the FAA was called upon to make
a series of procedural and substantive regulatory decisions when Braniff Airlines went bankrupt, leaving several hundred slots up for grabs.
To allocate this resource, the FAA decided not to use consensual
decisionmaking or conventional notice and comment rulemaking; instead, they used a lottery.9 0 The system has been heavily criticized by
industry representatives28 and leaves untouched, major regulatory
problems in the field.
In the area of aircraft noise and noise control, the deregulation of
the airline industry leaves unaffected a festering jurisdictional and
regulatory problem. Pursuant to the Noise Control Act of 1968, s2the
precursor to the Noise Control Act of 1972,283 the Federal Aviation
Administration is responsible for the enforcement of noise control
standards promulgated by the administration, in consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation and the Environmental Protection
285
Agency.2 84 Given the recognized destructive nature of airport noise,
the Federal Aviation Administration and the courts have attempted to
implement abatement programs by the use of affirmative prospective
regulation of aircraft noise. The program has met with limited success,
particularly when one considers the tremendous jurisdictional prob2 86
lems that exist in the field.
27 9

ld.

2"047 Fed. Reg. 35156 (1982).
2 847 Fed. Reg. 35160 (1982).
282
See Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968).
28342 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq. (1976), and 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1972) as amended by Quiet
Communities
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq. (Supp. 1979).
28
See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.1 et seq. (1981) for individual standards.
28
United States Department of Transportation, Aviation Noise Abatement Policy Act
(1976); Hildebrand, Noise Pollution:An Introduction to the Problemand an Outlinefor Future
Legal
Research, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 652 (1970).
20
" See British Airways Board v. Port Authority, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977); Air
Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); City of Burbank
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Regulation of airport noise is within a broad range of social programs where there is little honest theory suggesting that the open
market will provide an appropriate resolutory norm. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for students of regulation to question economic regulation
while at the same time recognizing that "deregulation... is not a viable
27
alternative for most health, safety and environmental regulation.1 1
While there is some disagreement regarding the need to control or
reduce the amount of noise associated with air transportation, and
while negotiation has not been selected as the device for such control, a
lesson still exists for those studying concensus process. By the promulgation of affirmative compliance standards by the federal government,
in the absence of effective consensual decisionmaking, a uniformly
agreed upon social objective (reduction of airport noise) was rendered
difficult to implement or enforce. Prospective regulation which is
divorced from those directly affected has not succeeded. Consensual
decisionmaking systems, on the other hand, appear to hold out a
greater opportunity for enforcement and compliance.
An evaluation of the CAB leads to slightly different conclusions. In
November 1977, the first major airline deregulation bill affecting air
freight, " ' was passed. Less than a year later, the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 became law, substantially changing the regulatory structure for domestic air travel.8 During this period, former President
Carter also indicated a desire to introduce basic open market competition concepts into international air transportation.8 Although the
legislation that ultimately ensued, the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979,81 cannot be characterized as a deregula-

tion venture, that Act is designed to stimulate international competition but at the same time protect U.S. airlines from anticompetitive acts
of foreign government-run competitors.282
Since the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, experts have been
in disagreement regarding the validity of the airline deregulation
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Griggs v. Alleghency County, 369
U.S.
2 84 (1962).
7The Regulatory Reform Act of 1981: Hearingson S. 1080, Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (Testimony of Robert B. Lave). See also Kelman, Regulation that Works, THE NEw REPUBLIC,
Nov. 25, 1978 at 16.
2
.Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (1977).
...
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
5
" United States Policy for Conduct of InternationalAir TransportationNegotiations, 2 Pub.
Papers
of President Jimmy Carter 1562 (1978).
"5 Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980).
2 2
" The debate over the appropriate means for stimulating healthy airline competition
is by no means over. See Is the U.S. Sabotagingits InternationalAirlines?,Bus. WEEK,Jan. 26,
1981 at 74.
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experiment.2 93 This change in regulatory focus, coupled with the controllers strike has made it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions. It is
clear that the CAB can perform certain functions vital to the consensus
process. The board has assessed competitive implications under complex market situations,2 94 has determined when and under what circumstances antitrust immunity ought to attach,295 and oversees a conference system designed to handle collective interests in the ticketing
area. 96 By performing these tasks, the agency has demonstrated the
capacity to perform functions that would be needed, were the primary
form of dispute resolution or policy formulation a consensual format.
There have been profound structural consequences resulting from
airline deregulation, going well beyond anything anticipated by the
architects of the deregulation program. 7 In the first year and one half
after the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, nineteen of the
largest airline carriers have been involved in a variety of merger
proposals. "'
The proponents of deregulation . . . were hopelessly naive in their often

implicit, always sanguine evaluations of the structural consequences of deregulation. Armed with the economic theory of competition, with evidence
suggesting an absence of significant economies of scale, with faith in the
efficacy of free market,...

and ... with a contagious fervor to deregulate

something, they assumed that there would not be a need for significant
2
"See Remarks by George A. Dalley, Member Civil Aeronautics Board, before the
Federal Aviation Administration's Sixth Annual Aviation Forecast Conference at the
Capital Hilton, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1980); Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic,
Load FactorsandMarket Shares. Eleventh in a series, publishedJuly 1, 1980; a staff study by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, Licensing Programs and Policy Development, Routes and
Authorities Division and Hearing Cases Analysis Division, Bureau of Domestic Aviation,
published Sept. 1980; J. Lauriac, Impact of Deregulation on the Air Transport System,
Progress Report Nos. 1-4 91980), 4 Rue de Solferino 75007, Paris, France; Office of
Policy and Analysis of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Regulatory Reform for the
General Reform for the General Commodity Segment of the Motor Carrier Industry,
Early Experience with Airline Deregulation: Some Implicationsfor Motor CarrierRegulatory
Reform (1980); Phillips, Airline Mergers in the New Regulatory Environment, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 856 (1981); Miler, Is Airline Deregulation Working?, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980 at 22.
""ISee Investigation Into the Competitive Marketingof Air Transportation,No. 36595, Order
Instituting Investigation (Sept. 13, 1979).
2
"Application filed by various airlines for prior approval of an agreement establishing
the Airline Fuel Corp., No. 27067, Agreement CAB 26748-Al, Order (Sept. 20, 1979)
(Finding no need to grant antitrust immunity pursuant to Section 414 of the Federal
Aviation Act; See UATP-1976 Agreements CAB 26433 and 26433-Al Order (June 12,
1980))
(denying antitrust immunity, at 34 of the Board Order).
296
1 See Filing of the Air Transport Ass'n, InvestigationInto the Competitive Marketingof Air
Transportation,
No. 36596, (filed Sept. 15, 1981).
29 7
Brodley, CAB Merge Policy Under Deregulation, conference paper delivered to the
American Bar Ass'n Sections of Antitrust and Public Utility Law (Oct. 20-21, 1980).
298Md.
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structural readjustments in the new competitive environment. (Footnote
omitted) . . .in this the proponents of deregulation were wrong. "

In the airline industry, the most lucid approach to the concentration
trend seems to be as follows:
To avoid the inevitable forced merger of a number of failing carriers-and,
in fact, to stymie consequent political pressures to deregulate the industrya policy favoring mergers that allows the development of more rational
routes and services should be encouraged....
The critical point is rather that one should not conclude that a merger has
the prescribed anti-competitive effects simply because the number of carriers is reduced....
Merger policy should foster efficiency and competition and not protect
300
particular carriers in the interest of preserving large numbers alone ....
In the last year, deregulation has ceased to be the principle regulatory event determining the success or failure of the domestic airline
market. Instead, the 25 percent service reduction which comes as the
consequence of the air traffic controllers' strike is of far greater significance. With the number of flights reduced, demand for existing
seats has increased, fuel costs have decreased, and with layoffs, salary
costs have decreased, all creating a somewhat artificial picture for the
airline industry. 0' These factors obscure comparisons or projections
for the study of consensus process.
3. FederalMaritime Commission
The power of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) to approve
conference agreements, and by that approval provide express exemption from the antitrust laws is similar to the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to approve collective ratemaking agreements." 2 In undertaking the competitive assessment, the Federal Maritime Commission is obligated to conduct an informal proceeding, after
publication of notice in the FederalRegisterindicating the specific agreement under consideration. The FMC may convene an oral hearing,

29Phillips, Airline Mergers in the New Regulatoiy Environment, 29 U. PA. L. REV. 856,
856-57 (1981).

"0ld. at 879.

3

'Thayer, Air Travel: Strike Means Friendly SkiesforAirlines, 248 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 14

(Nov.2 1981).
11

Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976); National Ass'n of Recycling Lndus. v.

Federal Maritime Comm'n., 658 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Federal Maritime Comm'n. v.
Pacific Maritime Conn'n., 435 U.S. 40 (1978); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschatt v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n., 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
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and the results of FMC deliberations regarding "approved agreements" are subject to judicial review.""
The FMC is obligated to use fair and open procedures in coming to
decisions regarding the antitrust immunity to be provided to different
conference activities. The FMC has primary jurisdiction to review the
anticompetitive consequences of such agreements, prior to review in a
federal court.30° As might be expected, the power to grant antitrust
immunity has been attacked during the "deregulation" period of the
late seventies.1 115 Questions have also come up regarding activities which
are technically outside approved agreements, and the resulting antitrust liability that flows from such activities. 06 In one proceeding involving an allegation of rate discrimination, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia chastised the Federal Maritime
Commission as follows:
The Commission engaged in wholly insufficient analysis of the harm posed
to United States commerce by the high shipping rates for waste paper-the
principal flaw being the Commission's illogical disregard for the pernicious
commercial effects which attend unreasonably steep freight costs. Hence,
the FMC's order declining to disapprove the challenged rates must be set
aside. The Commission's laxity challenges the very character of the Act
which, on one hand, grants considerable license to carriers, and on the other,
obligates the Commission to ensure that that license does not work to the
disadvantage of the national commerce. The basically facile agency reversal
of the ALJ, as evidenced by these formidable and unfound rate differentials
cannot stand.' 7
The Supreme Court has also expressed concern with the ability of
the Federal Maritime Commission to implement its own legislation. In
FederalMaritimeCommission v. SeatrainLines Inc., 0Sthe Court found that
the Federal Maritime Commission had completely misread its obligations regarding the interrelationship between the conference arrangement system, which allows entities to maintain independence, and the
""Interestingly, in United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., 584 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court held that the review to be given to decisions of the Federal
Maritime Comm'n. was an "arbitrary and capricious" test of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976),
whereas such proceedings are at times reviewed under a substantial evidence test. See
United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"See generally Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktieholaget Svenska Amerika Linien,
211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Conference v. United
States, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
05See, e.g., I Report to the President and Attorney General of the National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, ch. 13 (1979).
306United
States v. Atlantic Container Lines, Nos. 79-0271-72 (Indictments issued
June 1, 1979, nolo contendere pleas entered June 8, 1981).
'National Ass'n of Recycling Indus., 658 F.2d at 818.
30411 U.S. 726 (1973).
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oversight responsibility the Commission has in the area of mergers. 9
Notwithstanding the problems referenced above regarding implementation of statutory directives, the maritime industry recently
sought not only a reaffirmation of the immunity provided by the
Shipping Act 3 but also an elimination of the regulatory powers vested
in the Federal Maritime Commission.3 1 ' The legislation was opposed by
the Department ofJustice, the Department of Commerce, the Federal
Maritime Commission and the President, notwithstanding the fact that
those four entities had all demanded some form of reform for the
maritime industry, which suffers from extremely inefficient international competition. In opposing the legislation, the ability of the Federal Maritime Commission to continue to provide an oversight role was
not questioned; indeed, the government took the position that the
Federal Maritime Commission must continue vigorous oversight of the
3
operation of the conferences, using the antitrust laws as a guideline.
In addition to endorsing the capacity of the Federal Maritime Commission to continue some form of competitive oversight over collective rate
establishment, the government uniformly supported the creation of
shippers' councils, which would be provided antitrust immunity, and
which could be used as a negotiation balance to counteract the substan33
tial market power of the immunized carrier conferences.
While there has been substantial criticism of the Federal Maritime
Commission from the standpoint of intelligently taking into account
the antitrust laws, there is little question that the Commission is capable
of performing this role, and, in large part, has done so in an organized
and fair way. 3 4 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia found that the Federal Maritime Commission had passed
muster under a substantial evidence review in its evaluation of a complex pooling agreement between ten competing lines which carry
goods between the United States and Italy.15 The court found that the
Commission had appropriately supported a decision approving the
agreement, although it also found that the Department of Justice had
standing to challenge the activities of the Federal Maritime Commission, regarding their competitive effects. 3 6 Following recent prece3

09ld.

3'046
3

U.S.C. § 814 (1976).

1'See H.R. REP. 96-935, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (Omnibus Maritime Regulatory

Reform,
Revitalization and Reorganization Act of 1980).
32

' 1d.; and Letter From PresidentJimmy Carter to ChairmanJohn M. Murphy (July 20,
1979) (regarding H.R. 6899).
13

See Report supra note 301.
"'See United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
315!d.
316

1d. at 251.

310

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

dent, the Court found that the Justice Department can be an aggrieved
party in such agency proceedings, where the department perceives
that appropriate competitive considerations have not been taken into
7
account by the Federal Maritime Commission." Thus, not only does
the Federal Maritime Commission have the ability to take into account
competitive considerations, but it is also clear that the Justice Department can play a role not only as an intervenor, but as an "aggrieved
party" in a subsequent challenge to the activities of the Federal Maritime Commission.
The maritime industry has long relied on a conference method of
decision in coming up with specific rate determinations, protected by a
right of independent action and antitrust oversight of rate determinations made by conference groups."' While the industry pushed for
"closed conferences," there has been considerable resistance to this
phenomenon. In addition, shipper participation has been at best limited in the conference system. Despite these problems, the FMC has
displayed a capacity to evaluate market relationships, service records,
effectiveness of conference agreements, problems regarding rate disdeterioration of participation
parities, conference participation and
3 9
and similar issues on a regular basis.
There is a limited use of consensual decisionmaking at the rate level
as well as components of independent action. Taken as a whole, it
would appear that the FMC provides an example of an agency utilizing
consensus process, but experiencing periodic oversight problems.
CONCLUSION
In an era of regulatory reform, the elimination of unnecessary or
burdensome regulations, and the modification of market structures
which have produced noncompetitive markets is paramount. Achieving these objectives is not inconsistent with the use of new or different
systems of decisionmaking. Consensual decisionmaking systems, when
functioning effectively, hold out the promise of reduced compliance
and enforcement costs, optimal access for directly and indirectly
affected interests, optimal exchange of market information, and
meaningful competition at the level of price, service, efficiency and
innovation. On the other hand, a consensual decisionmaking system
can sometimes be nothing more than a guise for price fixing, carteliza3 7

1d.; United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, No. 79-1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
'See Federal Maritime Comm'n., South American Trade Study, Staff Report (Aug.
1980); Federal Maritime Comm'n., East Asia Trade Study, Staff Report (Aug. 1980).
3

3 9

- 1d.
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tion, intentional market manipulation, market stagnation, suppressed
entry, suppressed innovation and inefficiency.
Analysing individual systems provides little guidance when it is
understood that consensual systems require a unique combination of
events; the issues to be resolved, agency overseeing the process, and
competitive options all must be "just right" for such systems to work. If
the conditions are right, the system can be most effective. Under such
circumstances, a consideration of antitrust immunity seems reasonable. Naturally, open market theorists would argue that antitrust immunity in almost any situation is inconsistent with basic market directives and ought to be eliminated. A preferred result would be an open
market model, emphasizing two party negotiation, rather than collective decisionmaking. The risks inherent in this system are the potential
loss of organizational diversity, or other changes in market structure,
cream skimming, disparate rate structures, and most assuredly a loss of
the information exchange provided by any collective process.
In contrast to the open market, there are fully regulated systems
where the government is the primary decisionmaker, and the primary
mode of decisionmaking is rulemaking (either standard or hybrid) or
adjudication. These systems are often highly inefficient, plagued with
delay and subject to massive risks of noncompliance. Such systems are
due for change. However, comparing consensual, open market and
regulatory systems is not productive.
Each one of these systems has an appropriate place in the highly
complex American economy. Different institutional needs, market
demands, and service variables dictate the system to be applied. The
national policy in favor of competition is not necessarily one in favor of
nongovernmental involvement. Rather, it is a policy that favors giving
purchasers or users an opportunity to select a particular service or
product, and motivating sellers or service providers to act in an
efficient, innovative and reliable manner. It is a policy that demands
optimal utilization of resources. It abhors artificial monopoly power or
market manipulation, and demands that prices have a reasonable
relationship to cost and not be the result of some market artificiality. It
provides some reasonable screening of those who participate in given
markets, ensuring that only the most efficient resource users prevail.
These objectives are not accomplished through blind adherence to the
platitudes of the open market, the regulated market or some simplistic
and politically pleasing amalgamation of the two.
The questions in this area are most perplexing. Is it more likely that a
market will become efficient, innovative, fully informed, stable and
competitive, and that prices will bear reasonable relationship to cost, if
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consensual decisionmaking is adopted? The possibility that these factors will prove true justifies full consideration of the consensual alternative. The authors of Senate Bill 1601 believed this to be true,
stating, "[t]he use of negotiation and mediation can, in many cases,
result in rules which are developed in far less time and for far fewer
resources and which are far more reasonable than rules that would be
developed if traditional rulemaking procedures were used. '32 0 It is
hoped that the inquiry begun in Senate Bill 1601 will continue.

2
1601, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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